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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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do not work diligently at conserving our soil.

Cutting a slice of \$20 million off the national conservation program would take 75 people off the Soil Conservation staffs in North Dakota, about 1 to a district. The man we would lose would be the technician, the man who helps install practices, stake dams, plant trees, and all the on-the-spot jobs so important, because they must be done right.

In 1946, Dr. Hugh H. Bennett, Chief of the USDA Soil Conservation Service said, "The area of good cropland is shrinking everywhere, while population grows. The day will come when the combination of productive land and water will rank second only to people as the most important of all resources. Those who would thwart the progress of conservation, for whatever purpose, are in this day and age the enemies of mankind."

These are strong words, spoken 20 years ago, but they certainly fit this situation. North Dakotans all depend upon the soil in this agricultural State. We not only need to fight to keep the program of soil conservation we have, we need to work harder to get every landowner to participate.

If this legislation is passed in Washington it will reverse the trend, and the progress our State and the Nation has made will slow down, in many cases stop and go backward. Our congressional delegation needs letters the first part of April to help them oppose this Budget Bureau proposal.

#### PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S VIETNAM POLICY

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, there has been a great deal of comment in this body and in the press following President Lyndon B. Johnson's significant policy statement on Vietnam Wednesday night.

The President spelled out—in clear, concise terms—the goals and aims of the U.S. foreign policy in southeast Asia. He made no bones about our intentions and goals in this critical part of the globe.

One of the more forthright editorials I have seen in connection with the President's remarks was the one which appeared in the April 8, 1965, edition of the Washington Daily News. Equally significant were the evaluations of the President's remarks by several distinguished columnists, William S. White, Roscoe Drummond, and Joe Alsop, all appearing in the Washington Post today.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this editorial and these articles be printed in the Record at this time.

There being no objection, the editorial and articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News, Apr. 8, 1965]

#### WHY WE ARE IN VIETNAM—AND THE ALTERNATIVE

President Johnson's Baltimore speech not only was a first-class effort to clear away the persistent fog which unaccountably seems to hang over U.S. military activities in Vietnam—the President also gave the Communist world, and everyone else, the choice of an alternative.

He proposed a huge cooperative program to help southeast Asia to the development that its resources and population would make possible if it were not for the constant conflict which besets the area. He specifically invited Soviet Russia to join, and also North

Vietnam "as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible."

We are not going to pull out of South Vietnam until that country has its clear independence—securely guaranteed, free from outside interference. We will not be bluffed out, chased out, negotiated out; nor will we leave because we have grown tired.

We will engage in "unconditional" discussions of any type:

"We will never be second in the search for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam"—providing this means a free South Vietnam.

But until South Vietnam is cleared of invaders and its sovereignty riveted, we will use our power, "with restraint and with all the wisdom we can command." But—"we will use it."

The President scrupulously recited again the objectives of U.S. presence in Vietnam: We are there because we are keeping a pledge to help the South Vietnamese; but also to strengthen order in the whole world, to prevent all the nations of southeast Asia from being swallowed up.

He spelled out the nature of Communist aggression, what it already had done and what it threatens. And again, as he has said so often, we fight not because we like fighting but "because we have to deal with the world as it is." Or, he could have said, as the Communists have made it.

To speed up the alternative to war, Mr. Johnson proposed that the United States join in a billion-dollar effort to develop the southeast Asia area.

That's a lot of money, a billion dollars. But it is cheap compared to the price of war, in lives lost on both sides, as well as dollars spent for bombs and guns and rockets and warships which the President aptly said are "witness to human folly."

This put it straight up to the Communists—in North Vietnam, in Red China, in Russia. So long as they force violence on others, we will resist them with all our power. But if they want to use the knowledge we now have "to make this planet serve the real needs of the people who live on it" we are ready, able and eager.

The Communists, wherever they are, ought to know by now that President Johnson means what he says, on both counts. And that the American people, regardless of small quibblings which may be heard, are solidly behind the President's resolution, as well as his purpose.

This has never been made clearer than Mr. Johnson made it last night.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Apr. 9, 1965]

#### VIETNAM SPEECH: POLICY AS FIRM AS EVER

(By William S. White)

President Johnson's so-called new policy for dealing with Communist aggression in South Vietnam is not new in fact nor does it in the smallest way soften his real position.

To the contrary, he feels—and objective reading of what he said at the Johns Hopkins University supports him in this—that its meaning is simply firmly to establish the two bedrock necessities for remaining in Vietnam until aggression has been brought to a halt by self-enforcing peace arrangements that will not and cannot be later cast aside by the Communists as other agreements have been.

The vital words here are "self-enforcing." The President will never go along with some spurious deal resting only on Communist promises to quit attacking South Vietnam. For his own part, in short, he considers himself more deeply committed than ever before to bringing those attacks to an end. If others think he is less committed, as some seemingly do, the answer is simple: Surely, he ought to be the best witness of the intentions of Lyndon B. Johnson.

The first of the twin bedrock necessities to staying in Vietnam is a continuing American military action—which will be carried just as far as the Communists force it to be carried. The President is astonished, as to this point, that so much of the interpretation of his Johns Hopkins speech has so stressed his promise in some circumstances of American economic aid to Vietnam and southeast Asia generally and so kissed off these other passages:

"We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement. \* \* \* Peace demands an independent South Vietnam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interferences—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country." How do you get any more committed than this?

This continued American military action is not merely to help protect South Vietnam. It is vital to prevent what has always been the nightmare of American policymakers, the nightmare of a total collapse in South Vietnam's morale and government which might make impossible further effective American assistance of any kind.

The second bedrock necessity is to placate, so far as may be rationally possible, the endless fretful complaint from allied governments and some sections of responsible opinion at home that the United States is offering no constructive alternatives to continued war.

It is here that Mr. Johnson's suggestion for a cooperative economic development of southeast Asia takes its place. Once the nations directly involved begin this development in good faith, he is prepared to ask Congress to authorize a billion-dollar American investment—not by the way, a mere American gift—in such an enterprise. Here, again, the President is both disappointed and surprised at some Republican criticism of this as an effort to buy peace.

In the first place, we are already spending far more than a billion a year in South Vietnam alone, putting military and economic expenditures together. In the second place, what he is speaking of as a possibility for southeast Asia generally is already taking place in South Vietnam. In the third place, the principles of such a program were in fact recommended to President Kennedy by Mr. Johnson as Vice President as early as 1961. He sees it as about what we have done widely long since in Latin America to prevent chaos and Communist encroachment.

In the fourth place, this problematical and future American carrot, though sincerely held out if the Communists will make it possible to hold it out usefully, weighs far less than the here-and-now American stick that accompanies it. No country being attacked has in all history been given a more profound and more powerful military American guarantee than the guarantee the President has now given to South Vietnam.

#### A GREAT SPEECH

(By Joseph Alsop)

The President's great speech on the Vietnamese war was vintage Lyndon B. Johnson.

The man is so mysterious, so outside the common run of experience, precisely because qualities are mingled in him that in most men are flat opposites. Noble aims do not often go together with extreme craftiness; yet the speech exhibited the President pursuing the noblest aims in the craftiest imaginable manner.

High aspirations and warmly humane feelings are rarely combined with extreme toughness; yet in this speech, a toughness almost verging on ruthlessness was placed at the service of very high aspirations and warmly humane hopes. Then there is that matter of Johnson's "corniness," as some people like to call it.

Read the High point of the speech, the quotation from Deuteronomy addressed to North Vietnamese Communists and their allies: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: Therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live." If this be corny, one is inclined to say, make the most of it; for it is as good as it is true.

Politics being politics, alas, the craftiness and toughness must be given pride of place in further examination of this remarkable Johnsonian utterance. Even the timing of the speech was crafty.

For many weary weeks on end, the President has been beseeched, urged, even bullied to announce his war aims, to explain his decisions, to declare his willingness to negotiate. Under this incessant barrage of advice, he kept obstinately silent; he even indulged his weakness for downright conspiratorial secretiveness—and for a quite simple reason.

When the first bombing attacks on North Vietnam were ordered, the situation in South Vietnam was critical, even acutely dangerous. The President had waited almost overlong. (That is the right lesson to draw, by the way, from the admirable series of articles by Richard Dudman of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, which is now attracting much attention.) Overlong waiting had left the President in a position of weakness.

Offering carrots as well as sticks, inviting negotiations, proclaiming and defining aims—all these are always the wrong tactics, when acute danger has forced the adoption of a tough policy. They make toughness appear untough. They hint a flaw in the will. They seem to say, "I'll stop fighting at once if you'll just give me the smallest excuse for doing so."

The time to offer carrots as well as sticks, and to indicate willingness to talk, is after the tough policy begins to get results. General Taylor and the U.S. military staff in Saigon may perhaps be wrong in thinking that the results to date are as satisfactory as they suppose. But no one can doubt that the President's speech now will carry vastly more conviction than it would have carried immediately after the first bombing attack.

Again, the President's new carrot was as craftily offered as it was generously conceived. The North Vietnamese Communists were told, in effect, that they could make immense gains from a general southeast Asia development program—if only they would cease to be the instruments of the Chinese Communists' aggressive will.

The same must be said for what the President said about negotiations. No one can any longer say that "Johnson won't even talk." But "unconditional" discussions mean discussions in which neither side accepts conditions, and, therefore, discussions permitting our side to keep the pressure on until the desired final results begin to be in sight.

Finally, one cannot exaggerate the toughness implied by this grim speech—for it was indeed grim, as well as crafty and tough and full of high purpose and instinct with deep humane feeling. All this was stirred into one improbable mixture like a sort of oratorical marble cake. Consider this Johnsonian passage:

"We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement."

That closes all the doors except one. That means that this strange man, who dislikes painful decisions and is so clever that he generally manages to elude them, has made the grim decision, this time, to go to the very end of the road if need be, in order to avoid the terrible defeat that seemed to threaten in Vietnam only a little while ago.

But the door that is still left open is a

good door, through which the enemy can pass with honor and with profit. It is the door defined by the President's quotation from Deuteronomy. It is the kind of door the United States should always leave open, the kind of door the United States should never be ashamed of offering inducements for others to choose.

#### L.B.J. SPEAKS OUT: LEFT NOTHING IN DOUBT (By Roscoe Drummond)

President Johnson's strong and lucid report on Vietnam to the Nation—and to the world—leaves nothing in doubt.

Three consequences flow from it:

It will, I am certain, decisively unite the American people behind what is being done and whatever still must be done to successfully defend South Vietnam from aggression.

It puts the onus totally on Hanoi for refusing to seek peaceful settlement by opening talks with the United States.

It will enlist for the United States mounting support from world opinion—particularly the 17 unaligned nations which have appealed for negotiation. It will do so because the President says that he will talk with the aggressors or other nations anytime under any circumstances without any conditions.

I am convinced that only weakness and vacillation on the part of the President in his commitment to defend South Vietnam could divide the Nation.

There is no weakness, no vacillation in the actions which Mr. Johnson has taken in the past 2 months to show Hanoi that aggression will not pay.

There is no weakness, no vacillation anywhere in the address in which he expounded those actions.

His message is clear. "We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw"—until the aggression ceases.

But the President made it equally clear that the United States does not put one single condition, one single barrier, not even one diplomatic breath in the way of our willingness to discuss an end to the war.

In his Johns Hopkins speech he told everybody that the United States stands unconditionally ready to begin "unconditional discussions." To the 17 neutral nations he said, in effect: "Yes, we will talk; see if Hanoi will, too."

Does this mean that the United States is going to negotiate away the independence of South Vietnam? Does willingness to undertake "unconditional discussions" mean that there would be no conditions on the results of such discussions?

I can say with knowledge that it means no such thing. It means that nothing will keep the United States from the conference table except the absence of Hanoi. It also means that we will have only one objective to take to the conference table: the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from future attack.

Mr. Johnson makes this vital point: If Hanoi wants to talk and continue the aggression, we will talk and continue the pressure until the aggression is ended either by negotiations or by any other means.

He assures Hanoi—and the world—that we seek no overthrow of the North Vietnamese regime, no military base in South Vietnam, and that we stand ready to give enlarged assistance to any cooperative effort in which the nations of southeast Asia would collectively join.

The President is saying that defending South Vietnam successfully is not a road to war; it is the road to peace.

#### RESIDUAL FUEL OIL QUOTAS MUST BE ELIMINATED

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, the consumers and the oil in-

dustry of my State of New Jersey have long been burdened by an outmoded and unnecessary quota restriction on the importation of residual fuel oil. As my colleagues well know, the States of the eastern seaboard are large users of this low-cost fuel oil. The State of New Jersey, for example, has the third largest residual fuel oil consumption of any State in the Union; and, on a per capita basis, it is the largest user.

Residual fuel oil provides more industrial heat and power than do all other fuels, combined. It heats two-thirds of all apartment houses, and the majority of the State's schools, hospitals, hotels, and office buildings. This fuel must be readily obtainable at the lowest possible cost to the citizens of New Jersey, if we are to keep our economy growing.

I joined my distinguished colleagues in testifying at recent hearings, held by the Interior Department, to review the entire question of residual fuel import quotas. At that time I made absolutely clear my opposition to any continuance of these restrictions. We were most hopeful that the Secretary of the Interior would share this view, as it has long been apparent to those familiar with the problem that the quotas served no national security purpose, and, in fact, only served to protect the declining coal industry.

The Secretary's recent announcement that he intended to maintain the quotas with an increased allotment was a deep disappointment. The only thing that could be said for his decision is that half a loaf is better than no bread. Fortunately, the Secretary was persuaded that his original intention to maintain the quota in the New York marketing area, but to eliminate it entirely in other States, was wrong. Such a decision would have been the worst form of discrimination against New Jersey, which, as I have pointed out, relies very heavily on this fuel. It would certainly have encouraged bootlegging oil from nonquota States to quota States, with the attendant high costs. It is typical of the fair-mindedness we have learned to expect from Secretary Udall that he changed his mind, and dropped this regrettable program.

It seems to me that the Secretary is ready to change his mind entirely on this question; and I certainly hope he does. A recent article in the New York Times states:

Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall said today that there was no national security reason to impose quotas on importing heavy fuel oil.

This is one statement with which I heartily concur. The article also stated that a special Cabinet committee, under Secretary McNamara, had decided that there was no national-security basis for continuing these restrictions. If this story is true, then we can hope that these quotas will be done away with, once and for all. I was glad to note that the Secretary of the Interior had asked the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning to make a new study of this problem. This study must be concluded swiftly. It should not be used as a device to stall positive action on a situation of such critical importance to all the States

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of the eastern seaboard, and to New Jersey, in particular.

Mr. President, elimination of these quotas will lower fuel costs to New Jersey consumers and industry; it will speed our great industrial growth; and it will do away with an obsolete burden on our fuel industry. I am confident that the Secretary of the Interior will take this action in the near future.

I ask unanimous consent that the article from the New York Times and my testimony before the Interior Department hearings be included at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article and the statement were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Apr. 4, 1965]  
OIL IMPORT RULING IS ASKED BY UDALL—HE DISPUTES SECURITY BASIS FOR HEAVY-FUEL QUOTAS

(By Edwin L. Dale, Jr.)

WASHINGTON, April 3.—Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall said today there was no national security reason to impose quotas on importing heavy fuel oil.

Mr. Udall formally requested Buford Ellington, Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, to make a "searching new study" of this issue.

Earlier this week, Mr. Udall increased the amount of heavy oil, called residual oil, that could be imported into New England and Florida but did not abolish the quotas altogether, as he originally intended. He refrained from doing so because of a legal opinion from the White House that he could not abolish the quota so long as there existed a determination that national security was involved.

Coal interests have bitterly fought the lifting of the quotas. Coal competes with residual oil as the energy source for electric power in the East.

Today Mr. Udall made public a letter to Mr. Ellington in which he said his Department had made "a thoroughgoing review of this program and its many inequities."

#### CALLS FOR NEW STUDY

"During the course of our analysis, it seemed inescapable that the national security determination which forms the legal foundation of this program is without substance," he said.

"I hereby request that you make a searching new study of the entire issue and make an explicit finding concerning the national security basis of this program," Mr. Udall said.

A study in 1963 by Mr. Ellington's predecessor, Edward P. McDermott, did not reach a clear cut conclusion on the question of whether residual oil imports impaired the national security.

If Mr. Ellington decides that there is no national security reason to impose quotas on residual oil, they would have to be eliminated, not only for New England and Florida but also for the entire East Coast including New York. Eliminating the quotas, according to most analyses of the subject, could mean lower electric power costs to the consumer.

#### CABINET PANEL IN ACCORD

In a related development, it became known today that a special Cabinet Committee under the chairmanship of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had reached virtually complete agreement on a report that found no national security basis for imposing quotas on residual fuel oil. The existence of this report was denied by official sources yesterday.

Whether the study will ever be made public was not known. But the Committee re-

portedly found that the future expansion of coal output in the Appalachia region rested primarily with increased exports to Western Europe. Such an increase would depend, among other things, on lower rail freight rates from the mines to the ports.

The oil quotas have been imposed under a section of the 1954 extension of the Trade Agreements Acts that was primarily designed to curb imports of crude oil and thus give protection to domestic oil producers. Abolishing import quotas on crude oil is not at issue in the current controversy, though the annual amounts are a source of continuing dispute.

The McNamara Committee, whose existence had not been formally announced, was established by the President last summer to examine a proposal by coal and railroad interests to reduce the quotas on residual oil only. This proposal was rejected yesterday.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR WILLIAMS OF NEW JERSEY BEFORE THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENT'S HEARINGS ON OIL IMPORTS, MARCH 10-11, 1965

New Jersey consumed nearly 50 million barrels of residual fuel oil in 1963. This gave the State the third largest residual fuel oil consumption of any State in the Union; and on a per capita basis it has, by far, the largest consumption.

Residual fuel oil heats two-thirds of all apartment houses in New Jersey, the bulk of the State's schools, hospitals, hotels and office buildings and provides more industrial heat and power than all other fuels combined. In addition, about 28 percent of the State's electric power is generated by steam plants burning residual fuel oil. It is clear, therefore, that the availability of residual fuel oil in sufficient quantities and at the lowest possible price is of paramount importance to New Jersey's economic welfare.

At present such availability does not exist in New Jersey nor anywhere else on the east coast. The imports restrictions on residual fuel oil have raised prices, as the Secretary of the Interior and other Government officials have freely acknowledged, and created supply bottlenecks through inequitable distribution of import quotas. According to industry estimates, the cargo price of residual fuel oil might decline by nearly 20 cents per barrel if imports restrictions were lifted. For New Jersey this could mean an annual savings of \$10 million.

There is no justification for the continuation of these restrictions, since the production of domestic residual fuel oil is rapidly phasing out. We in New Jersey are well aware of this. About 86 percent of the total refining capacity of the 17 east coast States is located within a 75-mile radius around Trenton. Yet, all of these refineries together no longer produce enough residual fuel oil to meet the demand of just our State. The reason is that now only 8 percent of the crude oil processed in these refineries is turned into residual fuel oil, compared to 21 percent in 1963. At the U.S. gulf coast, from where the east coast gets additional domestic supplies of this product, the residual fuel oil yield is even lower—only 4.5 percent per barrel of crude oil.

Hence, our only logical supply sources for this product are the export refineries of the Caribbean area where the residual fuel oil yield is over 50 percent.

The only imaginable reason for restricting the supplies from this source is to force some U.S. consumers to shift to alternate fuels, usually less suitable for their purposes. This is end-use control of fuels, even if the Government denies it, and has no room in a competitive economy. We therefore urge the Government to restore competition to the fuels sector of the east coast economy by lifting the restrictions on residual fuel oil imports.

#### BLUEFIELD, W. VA.—THE ALL AMERICA CITY

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, it is a pleasure, both to me personally, and, I am sure, to the entire State of West Virginia, to join in the well-deserved recognition extended to the city of Bluefield, W. Va., as an All America City. Bluefield was among the cities selected most recently for this honor by the National Municipal League and Look magazine on the record of service to the populations.

Mayor Henry F. Warden, and the three existing members of the city council—H. T. Goforth, Paul Hudgins, and Woodrow Wilson—deserve great credit for the honors bestowed upon the city. City Manager R. G. Whittle and Chiefs William J. Winters of the Bluefield police department and Gordon Damron of the Bluefield fire department and all other municipal employees should also share in the honor.

I have long recognized the vital spirit that pervades this city at the southern tip of the Mountain State. I felt it a privilege to join in the city's application for its very forward-looking urban renewal project, which is now well into execution. The improvements to U.S. Highways 19 and 460 which extend through the project will serve the city well.

The study of the city's central business district, financed with Housing and Home Finance Agency aid, received my support from the first announcement that it was needed.

Bluefield is also served well by its two daily newspapers—the Sunset News-Observer and the Daily Telegraph. They have brought the piercing light of public interest to many projects that have lifted the city to a position of leadership in the State.

The jury of outstanding Americans who made the selections of Bluefield and others as "All America Cities," noted the success of the Bluefield Area Development Corporation in hunting new industries for the city. One of the most enjoyable—both as a source of recreation to the city's populace and visitors as well as a source of income to the city—is the Ridge Runner, billed as the "world's shortest interstate railroad," and which travels three-quarters of a mile along the scenic East River Mountain.

A total of 44,000 people rode the railroad last year to admire the scenery.

Bluefield was incorporated in 1889. Since then its population has grown to 19,561 and it sees no end to its growth potential.

Once again, let me extend my congratulations to Bluefield, a city in which I once lived when I was very young, and to the countless civic and business leaders and to each citizen for the public-spirited progress which the city has made and which has now attracted the well-deserved attention of the Nation.

#### NATIONAL SECURITY DEMANDS MIX OF MANNED BOMBERS AND MISSILES

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, on April 6, the Senate unanimously adopted S.

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800 which dealt with military procurement authorizations for the fiscal year of 1966. I would like to compliment the members of both the Appropriations and the Armed Services Committees for their usual fine job. Particular notice should be taken of the exceptional work done by the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), who was required to shoulder additional burdens as a result of the unfortunate illness of the chairman of both of the committees, Senator RUSSELL.

It is my hope that the Secretary of Defense and the administration will take note of the unanimous approval of the Members of the Senate on this bill. This bill again expresses the will of the Senate that adequate steps be taken to insure that an adequate "follow-on" manned bomber program is started at the earliest possible moment. This position is consistent with the course urged by our leading military minds. Of particular significance is the unanimous backing by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of early action so that the work on this aircraft should proceed to the project definition phase in 1966. The \$82 million added by the committees to the fiscal 1966 authorizations will allow this progress.

Even a cursory glance at long-range prospects for our strategic capabilities if such an aircraft is not developed offers convincing proof of the need for the aircraft. Gen. Thomas Power, the recently retired commander in chief of SAC, painted this alarming picture:

Even if agreement had been reached on the desired characteristics and the decision were made today to award a contract for the development of this or any other new strategic bomber, it would take 8 to 10 years until combat wings could be equipped with it.

By that time, all B-47's would have been long retired, the remaining B-52's would be worn and obsolete and the limited number of B-58's in SAC's inventory (only 80 at present) would be obsolescent at best.

Thus, there would be a dangerous gap, and the gap keeps widening with every day final decision for bomber replacements is postponed.

General Power is not the only knowledgeable military man who voices this warning. This year the new chief of staff of the Air Force, General McConnell testified that the decision to proceed on this matter cannot be put off beyond next year. In this view, General McConnell is merely reaffirming what his predecessor, General LeMay, has repeatedly told both the committees of the Congress and the Nation. Shortly before his recent retirement, General LeMay stated:

I am afraid the B-52 is going to fall apart on us before we can get a replacement for it. There is a serious danger that this may happen.

I strongly urge my colleagues in the Congress to insure that this necessary money be authorized and appropriated so that there will be no additional delay in this vital matter. I also strongly urge the administration to implement this program as soon as possible. Our national security demands that we maintain a balanced mix of missiles and manned bombers.

Surely our recent experiences in Vietnam have impressed on all of us the need

for a flexible arsenal of weapons. To allow our defense posture to be dependent on an all-or-nothing missile policy arrived at by default cannot be defended either as a true economy or as sound tactics.

#### JAMES MADISON MEMORIAL LIBRARY ON SQUARE 732

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I was delighted to see the introduction yesterday by Senators HOLLAND, ROBERTSON, CARLSON, BENNETT, and JORDAN of North Carolina, of Senate Joint Resolution 69. As I understand it, this resolution would authorize the construction of the third building for the Library of Congress on square 732, would name it the James Madison Memorial Building, and would provide for a Madison Memorial Hall within it.

The purposes of this joint resolution are, therefore, identical with the purposes of the legislation which Senators CLARK, LAUSCHE, and MCCARTHY, and I, introduced on July 22, 1963—namely, S. 1920, of the 88th Congress. Its purposes also are identical with those of the proposals made early in 1963 by Representative WILLIAM B. WIDNALL, of New Jersey.

Square 732 is the very large parcel of property south of Independence Avenue, across from the main Library building, which now stands vacant. As I pointed out in the Senate on November 19, 1963, at pages 21220-21224, of the RECORD, the justification given Congress for clearing square 732 of its businesses and residences specifically was to provide a site for the third Library building.

Subsequent to the Federal acquisition and clearing of this property in 1962, however, the proposed use for it became entangled in a proposal for a memorial park and statute to honor James Madison. The Architect of the Capitol, who in the June 17, 1960, hearings described square 732 as "an ideal location for the Library," in 1963 began to describe it as unsuitable and too small. He proposed instead, the taking of squares 787 and 788, east of the Library Annex. These blocks contain many restored houses and a beautiful church, which, I may add, is frequently attended by the First Family. The taking of these blocks would have meant the unnecessary expenditure of millions of dollars and the unnecessary destruction of one of Capitol Hill's most beautiful residential areas.

Representative WIDNALL, I, and others argued that the original assumption under which square 732 was acquired and cleared should be followed. We showed that there clearly is sufficient space on this site for a building which would fill the stated needs of the Library. We argued that President Madison could be properly honored by naming the Library building after him and by the placement of some memorial, such as a statue, in a prominent location.

Above all, Mr. President, we sought to help secure a building for the Library, under conditions satisfactory to the taxpayers. I very much regret the delay in meeting this need for additional Library space.

Our proposal was neglected by the power structure which determines these developments on Capitol Hill. But the misuse of square 732 also was prevented.

The first ray of hope was seen when, several months ago, senior members of the responsible House committees agreed with the Widnall approach, and introduced proposed legislation to build the Library on square 732. I therefore delayed the reintroduction of my bill, so as not to take any chance of interfering with a similar resolution of the problem by members of the responsible Senate committees.

The introduction yesterday of Senate Joint Resolution 69 apparently represents the announcement of a satisfactory settlement which will result in consideration soon of the Library's needs. The Library of Congress is an outstanding institution, under excellent administration. I am encouraged by these signs that it will soon secure sufficient space, under conditions satisfactory to the taxpayers.

#### ORGANIZED MAIL CAMPAIGNS

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, since the session opened, I have received considerable mail concerning section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act. While many have written with obvious conviction and sincerity, it has also been apparent that some letters are sent as part of an organized campaign against repeal of this section. I am sure my experience is not unique.

In this connection, I call to the attention of the Senate an editorial published recently in the Machinist, the official weekly newspaper of the International Association of Machinists. I ask that this editorial be printed in full at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Machinist, Apr. 8, 1965]

#### STUFFING THE MAILBOX

An organized campaign is underway to deceive Congress about the public attitude toward those so-called "right-to-work" laws.

The perpetrators of this plot are the extremist organizations, the John Birch Society, the National Right-to-Work Committee, the Young Americans for Freedom and their allies.

Like everything else they touch, the extremists are now corrupting the American right to petition Congress.

Their letterwriting campaign is as phony as a stuffed ballot box. That's exactly what the extremists try to do by writing four or five letters apiece.

#### EXTREMIST TECHNIQUE

Fortunately, their letterwriting technique has just been exposed in another campaign, that one directed against the Xerox Corp. It's a remarkable parallel.

As part of a promotional program last year, Xerox contributed \$4 million to Telson Foundation. The foundation used the money to produce a television series on the United Nations, one of the main targets of the John Birch Society.

The Birchers were called on for a letterwriting campaign against Xerox just as they have now been called on for letters to Congress defending section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act that makes right-to-work laws legal.



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be purchased at about \$200 per acre, and that the remaining 10,000 acres, inclusive of 1,000 acres not in the single ownership, could be acquired for \$20 to \$25 per acre.

One of the principal functions of the national forest is protection and management watersheds such as are exemplified by the south Fork of the Provo River. The watershed lands include about 500 acres in stream bottom lands; about 500 acres in open, high usins; some 7,000 acres in open sagebrush and mountain brush located on the steeper terrain; and about 3,000 acres in scattered stands of aspen or mixed conifers generally located on northern or eastern exposures. Excessive grazing by livestock and wildlife in the past has reduced the quantity and quality of vegetative cover on steeper slopes and south exposures to less than is required for stabilizing the shallow, gravelly soil. Dispersal of ownership through sales could lead to accelerated use and damage. Continuing soil losses are evidenced by sheet and gully erosion. The timber stands have been heavily cutover and are with appraisable commercial value.

#### ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. MORTON:

Address by Thomas H. Brigham, Republican State chairman, delivered before Republican county organization of Winston County, Ala.

By Mr. CHURCH:

Editorial entitled "A Call To Hate?" published in the Idaho-Utah Baptist Messenger on September 1964.

By Mr. MCINTYRE:

Article on the rescue from Rowland Cave, at Mountain View, Ark., published in the Washington Evening Star of April 6, 1965.

By Mr. MCGOVERN:

Article on "One-Room Public Schools," published in Time magazine for April 9, 1965.

By Mr. SALTONSTALL:

Resolutions on voting rights and the situation in Selma, Ala., adopted by five Massachusetts towns and cities.

#### HENRY H. FORD, AMERICAN DIPLOMAT

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, Henry H. Ford, our American Counsel General in the largest American diplomatic and consular establishment overseas, died March 9, in the service of his country when returning to his post at Frankfurt, Germany, from a meeting with our Ambassador McGhee in Bad Godesberg.

I knew, and worked with Henry Ford in the old Army Air Corps, in which I also was an officer. He was one of our most trusted public servants. After our military service I followed Mr. Ford's career carefully. He joined the Foreign Service of the United States and rose rapidly to positions of trust and responsibility. Among other assignments, he was Consul General in Casa Blanca, Comptroller of President Truman's point 4 program, Executive Director of the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern, south Asian, and African affairs, and budget officer of the Department of State.

Henry Ford was a dedicated soldier and public servant. His unfortunate and

accidental death is not only a personal tragedy to me and his many military, Federal, and Foreign Service friends; it is a bell that tolls a loss to our Nation's service. Henry Ford had the personal competence and integrity that, in the Foreign Service, would certainly have eventually resulted in a Presidential recognition of his ambassadorial potential.

The Nation, and the Foreign Service, will miss a personality not soon forgotten by his friends.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to yield the floor, so that other Senators may dispose of whatever business they may wish to dispose of. However, I wish to have recognition when they have finished, because, as is always the case, I have certain technical things to dispose of in connection with the bill, and to make them a part of the Record, and to make some brief remarks.

#### THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, on Wednesday evening, the President of the United States delivered what was in my opinion a truly magnificent address. In it, he properly said that it is the firm determination of the United States to prevent a Communist takeover in South Vietnam and in southeast Asia.

I think this policy is absolutely necessary. If South Vietnam were to fall, Laos and Cambodia would also fall. Then Thailand would be three-fourths encircled and would in all probability go over to the Communists very quickly. This would mean that Burma to the north and Malaysia to the south would be in grave danger.

I have received advice from Burma indicating that the situation there is very grave. In my judgment, Burma, threatened as it is by a Chinese invasion down the Burma Road, which it could keep back only with great difficulty, might not have the will to resist. Malaysia, caught between the Communists from the north and Indonesia, which is seven-eighths Communist, from the south, would be crushed.

Then all of southeast Asia would go into Communist hands.

Some years ago I had the opportunity of talking with a distinguished Indian diplomat, who could not be classified as pro-Western, but who was certainly not pro-Communist. He was probably a neutralist. I asked him whether India could remain non-Communist if southeast Asia were to go Communist. The reply of this diplomat was immediate and emphatic. His statement was that India could not remain outside the Communist fold for more than a year.

If we look at the map of Asia we see that this would mean that Japan would in all probability be compelled to depart from its Western alliance and become the manufacturer and provider for the mainland of Asia. It would be almost impossible for the United States to hold the

Philippines. Therefore, all of Asia would go into Communist hands.

Furthermore, a Communist China and a Communist Asia would be able to make a much greater appeal to the people of Africa than could the Russians, who are predominantly a white people. The black people of Africa would find a much closer tie with the brown and yellow people of Asia than they would with the white people of Europe or of Russia. We could expect, therefore, that nearly all of Asia and Africa would come under the influence of the Chinese Communists and their more reckless anti-Western points of view.

The democratic alliance would then consist of North America and Western Europe and, we would hope, of as much of Latin America as would be possible. It would face an aggressive, anti-Western, Communist alliance of nearly all Asia and Africa.

If we learned anything during the 1930's, it was that aggression should be checked in its early stages, before it acquires momentum; that once the snow-slide of aggression starts, it sweeps on with cumulative force, smothering freedom everywhere until it is firmly resisted. If we fail to check aggression wherever it occurs we permit it to gain strength and momentum until ultimately we must defend the Nation with an all-out effort. But if we wait, we must make this effort after many other countries and tens of millions of other people have been sucked into the totalitarian dictatorship.

Therefore, I think the President was absolutely wise in saying that we would resist the Communist takeover.

But the President did not confine himself to that. He also said that we would negotiate and would seek peace. He did not set specific terms for negotiation. This is what many Americans have been urging. It does not imply any weakening of the American position. It does indicate that we are ready to sit down to try to work out a durable peace with those who at present regard themselves as our enemies.

It is very significant that Communist China has rejected this proposal in the most scathing of terms, and that the press dispatches out of North Vietnam indicate that the North Vietnamese may do the same. But the door is open and we hope very much that they will accept.

In the third place, the President pledged the United States to join with other countries in an economic and social program to improve the condition of the people in southeast Asia, with special reference to the people in the great basin of the Mekong River, where work is already being carried on.

The President pledged himself to devote a billion dollars to this project. This need not be the ceiling. This is not an attempt to buy peace, as some Senators have charged. It is an attempt to use the constructive resources of the United States to reach a basis for a friendly peace in southeast Asia.

I am very happy that this great speech has been warmly welcomed by those with open minds. I am pleased that in London and in Paris it has been received with acclaim. I believe that among other

people it will be received with great approval.

I am happy that the newspapers and journals of this country have rallied to the support of the policy which the President announced.

I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD at this point an editorial published in the New York Times of April 8. In it this great newspaper, probably the best newspaper in the United States, strongly endorses the President's position and observes that his policy is one in which the country can take pride.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Apr. 8, 1965]

#### THE PRESIDENT OPENS THE DOOR

President Johnson last night projected an American policy on Vietnam in which the country can take pride. He indicated that the United States now may begin to apply as much determination and ingenuity to seeking peace as it has to waging war. He has wisely broken his long silence on American purposes. And, much as this newspaper and many Members of Congress have urged, he has restored the olive branch that balances the arrows in the eagle's claws.

The President's proposal to seek a Vietnam settlement through unconditional discussions with the governments concerned opens the door to peace explorations in a wide variety of forums with Hanoi, Moscow, even Peking, although not with the Vietcong directly. He has broken new ground as well, in explicitly offering to North Vietnam American-aided regional development, food-for-peace programs, and implying the possibility of increased recognition—peaceful association with others.

In urging Secretary General Thant to initiate a plan immediately for increased development in southeast Asia to aid in the establishment of peace rather than merely to follow its restoration, he has given wings to long-pending, imaginative proposals by men such as Ambassador Chester Bowles and Canada's Prime Minister Lester Pearson.

The size of the proposed American contribution—\$1 billion is half the estimated cost of the initial five-dam program of Mekong Valley development—is less important than the willingness to participate for the first time in a jointly financed aid program with the Soviet Union.

The President's speech has, in short, at last begun the essential process of changing the context of a problem that, as usually stated, appears insoluble. In proposing a South Vietnam tied to no alliance and containing no foreign military base, the President has accepted the concept of ultimate American military withdrawal and of an independent South Vietnam that would be neutral and yet free to seek outside assistance if threatened.

Most important, the President's speech nowhere repeats Secretary Rusk's vague and worn-out homily about negotiations being inconceivable until the Communists leave their neighbors alone. It recognizes that negotiations are not only conceivable but necessary if that desirable purpose is ever to be achieved.

President Johnson has now provided a bold answer to the appeal made to him last week by the chiefs of 17 nonaligned states and earlier by many of our allies. It would be too optimistic to expect a favorable reply from the Communist countries, at least at first. But they are provided with plenty of food for thought.

Neither they nor anyone else can dispute the fact that a serious peace offer has been

made. It is now clearly up to them to make a reasonable response.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD at this point an editorial from the New York Post. The editorial appeared on Wednesday afternoon, before the President delivered his speech. It is interesting to note that it declared its support for a statement very similar to the one which the President gave.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Post, Apr. 7, 1965]

#### THE PRESIDENT'S CHANCE

President Johnson's speech tonight on United States goals in Vietnam can be more effective in shaping the outcome of the war than many bombing raids.

Even before Chou En-lai's message to U Thant, the United States had growing evidence that the Communists were as split over tactics and assessments as is opinion in the West and in Asia. Moscow, for example, has been urging negotiations between North Vietnam and the United States as the parties principally concerned.

Chou now says such talk should be with the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front (Vietcong) and exclude both Hanoi and Peking. Chou's omission of Hanoi is especially significant in the light of the report of divergences between Ho Chi Minh and the Vietcong.

Apparently there is wide argument in the Communist camp over the desirability of negotiations, who should negotiate, the terms of negotiations, the preconditions for negotiations and the extent to which the Vietnamese Communists should seek outside help.

Surely it is in the interest of both this Nation and mankind to strengthen the hands of the group that, for reasons of its own, is hospitable to the idea of a negotiated settlement—especially when even such crucial Asian allies as India and Japan show little enthusiasm for the line of our "hawks."

On "Meet the Press," Presidential aid McGeorge Bundy indicated that the United States was not putting rigid preconditions on the circumstances of negotiations. That is worth saying plainly so that the U.S. position cannot be misrepresented or misunderstood.

Bundy also defined the U.S. purpose in Vietnam as designed to uphold the right of the South Vietnamese people to determine their own destiny. Here again U.S. policy has been open to misunderstanding. Sometimes that policy is portrayed as part of an irreconcilable struggle with Asian communism, a struggle that requires a U.S. military presence on the Asian mainland.

Self-determination is negotiable; a rollback is not.

Mr. Johnson's speech can have a momentous impact on alignments in the Communist world. It could be especially meaningful if it spells out his image of a Marshall Plan for southeast Asia along with a formula for political conciliation.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The leading Republican paper of the East Coast, the New York Herald Tribune, in its editorial of April 8th, applauded the President on his effective combination of the stick and the carrot. I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Apr. 8, 1965]

#### MORE CARROT, SAME STICK

United States policy toward North Vietnam has been a combination of the stick and the carrot. Without letting up on the use of the stick, President Johnson last night held out a pretty fat carrot—a \$1 billion American investment for the economic development of southeast Asia which North Vietnam would share. He sweetened the carrot by speaking of an independent, neutralized South Vietnam, "free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country."

He combined this with an offer of "unconditional discussions" for a settlement of the conflict. That should assure friends and foes alike that Washington, far from opposing a negotiated arrangement, is ready to proceed immediately to the conference table without prior conditions by either side—if our opponents are.

Whether this does or does not represent a change in the U.S. position is hardly a subject for fruitful argument. Washington maintained that it would negotiate when the time was ripe. Perhaps the President feels that time has arrived.

He may very well be right. Sooner or later—and it may be sooner than we think—Peking and Hanoi will have to sue for peace. The time must come—if it has not come already—when they will admit to themselves (never to others) that the game in South Vietnam is up; that the cost of continuing the venture is prohibitive in damage to North Vietnam by conventional American bombs; and in potential damage to Communist China by nuclear American bombs; that the venture itself has become highly questionable since the United States directly committed itself to the war against the Vietcong in the South, as well as to a war against North Vietnam, and if necessary against Communist China, from the air.

The problem for both Peking and Hanoi is how to pay our price, which is the cessation of Communist aggression against South Vietnam, without losing face, bearing in mind that face is about the last thing in the world that an oriental can lose. The device which they may have in mind was indicated in Premier Chou En-lai's message to Secretary General U Thant. It is to pretend that they have had nothing to do with the Vietnamese conflict and to invite the United States to conclude a settlement directly with the Communist Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam.

This, however, is not what Washington has in mind. The President spoke of "discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones. \* \* \* And that is what Peking and Hanoi want to avoid because public exposure would endanger their face.

One side or the other will have to give ground as to the manner in which the Communist retreat is to be negotiated. But the manner is not as important as the substance, and it is the substance which we seek—the security and independence of South Vietnam and the rest of Asia not now in Communist hands. If Peking and Hanoi must save face, facilities may somehow be provided. Their true face is perfectly apparent to all.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, finally, the Baltimore Sun, the newspaper from the neighboring city, which has such high standards, commended the President for the appropriateness of his speech, for giving clarity to the discussion on Vietnam and for his emphasis on peace and development.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

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There being no objection, the editorial is ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun, Apr. 8, 1965]

## THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

President Johnson struck the right note in his speech last night at the Johns Hopkins University. He lifted the discussion of the war in Vietnam from the purely military measures to the higher ground of an American policy that puts the proper emphasis on our desire to search for the peaceful settlement and our readiness to contribute generously to a program of economic development for southeast Asia, which could include North Vietnam.

The President thus has supplied what, to many Americans, seemed to be a missing element in previous official explanations of the U.S. policy. His speech does not mean that peace will be established at once, since the Communist side has yet to show whether it is ready even to discuss a settlement, but it widens the approaches to negotiations and thus strengthens the U.S. position.

Mr. Johnson repeated his earlier statement that the United States would never be second in the search for peace and went on to declare that "we remain ready—with this purpose—for unconditional discussions." This is an important move forward from previous indications that discussions would be agreed to only after the Communist side stopped its aggression against South Vietnam.

The President was explicit in saying that he will ask Congress to "join in a \$1 billion American investment" in the economic development of southeast Asia when peace is assured, and in expressing his hope that U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, will use the prestige of his office and his own knowledge of Asia to initiate, "as soon as possible," with the countries of Asia a plan for cooperation in increased development. This helps to make it clear to Asians, as well as to others, that the United States is concerned first with peace rather than with military action.

In the President's speech there is an inducement for the Communists to end the war and an inducement for other governments to join in the effort to obtain a settlement. The present military action by the United States will continue, and it should be noted that the President pointed out that patience and determination will be required to see it through, but everyone concerned should now have a better understanding of our policy and purpose.

We can all agree with the President's statement that we have no wish to see thousands of Asians or Americans die in battle, or to see North Vietnam devastated, and approve his promise that our military power will be used with restraint and "with all the wisdom we can command."

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, other editorials will be published, and I shall seek to insert them in the RECORD if other Senators do not do so.

However, I hope very much that we shall not only applaud the President for his speech but that we shall also exhibit some staying power to carry the program through. I urge this because I remember how, when the Korean war first broke out, and President Truman made his fateful and, I believe, courageous and correct decision to go to the aid of South Korea, there were many who praised this step at the time but who before a year had passed were denouncing our action in Korea as Truman's war, which it was not.

The war in Vietnam—though it appears to be far removed—is freedom's war and I urge the Nation and the Con-

gress to support the determination of this Nation as expressed by the President, and to persist in that support.

It was a war in behalf of peace and collective security. I hope that this time we have not only support at the beginning, but support in the hard and difficult months and possible years which follow.

## EDITORIALS ON PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S ADDRESS ON VIETNAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, subsequent to President Johnson's profound address on Vietnam, at Johns Hopkins University the other night, editorials have appeared in many newspapers. Five which have come to my attention seem exceptionally well-balanced and revealing of the spirit and import of the President's statement. If these editorials stress the humanity and conciliation in his words, it is not because the editorialists are less aware of the painful fact that conflict is still the order of the day in Vietnam. They know, as does the President, that the conflict will continue without surcease before peace begins to take form, and that while words can instill hope, acts and events alone can determine the validity of that hope. But the writers also recognize that an obsessive infatuation with conflict and military power can obscure the many ways which there may be to peace in southeast Asia. The important point, as I see it, is to bring these ways out from under the smoke of battle, and begin to examine and to explore them. That, in my judgment, was a most significant achievement of the President's address, and the editorials which I shall insert in the RECORD very properly focus on it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that editorials which appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Baltimore Sun, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and the Washington Star be included at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Apr. 8, 1965]

## THE PRESIDENT OPENS THE DOOR

President Johnson last night projected an American policy on Vietnam in which the country can take pride. He indicated that the United States now may begin to apply as much determination and ingenuity to seeking peace as it has to waging war. He has wisely broken his long silence on American purposes. And, much as this newspaper and many Members of Congress have urged, he has restored the olive branch that balances the arrows in the eagle's claws.

The President's proposal to seek a Vietnam settlement through "unconditional discussions" with "the Governments" concerned opens the door to peace explorations in a wide variety of forums with Hanoi, Moscow, even Peking, although not with the Vietcong directly. He has broken new ground as well, in explicitly offering to North Vietnam American-aided regional development, food-for-peace programs and—implying the possibility of increased recognition—"peaceful association with others."

In urging Secretary General Thant to initiate a plan immediately for increased development in southeast Asia to aid in the establishment of peace rather than merely to follow its restoration, he has given wings to long-pending, imaginative proposals by

men such as Ambassador Chester Bowles and Canada's Prime Minister Lester Pearson.

The size of the proposed American contribution—\$1 billion—is half the estimated cost of the initial five-dam program of Mekong Valley development—is less important than the willingness to participate for the first time in a jointly financed aid program with the Soviet Union.

The President's speech has, in short, at last begun the essential process of changing the context of a problem that, as usually stated, appears insoluble. In proposing a South Vietnam tied to no alliance and containing no foreign military base, the President has accepted the concept of ultimate American military withdrawal and of an independent South Vietnam that would be neutral and yet free to seek outside assistance if threatened.

Most important, the President's speech nowhere repeats Secretary Rusk's vague and worn-out homily about negotiations being inconceivable until the Communists "leave their neighbors alone." It recognizes that negotiations are not only conceivable but necessary if that desirable purpose is ever to be achieved.

President Johnson has now provided a bold answer to the appeal made to him last week by the chiefs of 17 nonaligned states and earlier by many of our allies. It would be too optimistic to expect a favorable reply from the Communist countries, at least at first. But they are provided with plenty of food for thought.

Neither they nor anyone else can dispute the fact that a serious peace offer has been made. It is now clearly up to them to make a reasonable response.

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 8, 1965]

## SWORD AND OLIVE BRANCH

President Johnson, in his address last night, made it clear that the United States is ready for "unconditional discussions" of peace in southeast Asia and he made it equally clear that our Government is ready to carry on the defense of South Vietnam until that country's independence is secure.

His address at Johns Hopkins does not leave much room in which to argue that there is anything ambiguous about American policy. He was at great pains to explain why we are in Asia and why we cannot leave in disregard of our commitments. And he took equal pains to explain the Nation's readiness to discuss, without preconditions, the means of establishing peace. He made even more specific than he has heretofore his proposal that the nations of southeast Asia turn from war to peaceful development under a program toward which we are willing to commit a billion dollars in aid and the technical assistance of an American mission headed by Eugene Black.

It will be a tragedy for southeast Asia if the governments involved disregard either the sword or the olive branch in the President's address. They go together and they make up the joint elements of our policy. The speech, although a response to the 17 nations who addressed the American Government, was in many ways directed to the Government of North Vietnam. And it is from that Government that we hope that some affirmative response may come. There is no insurmountable conflict between the legitimate aims of North Vietnam and the justifiable aspirations of South Vietnam. It ought to be possible for both of them to turn from war to the constructive arts of peace which the President presented as an alternative to armed combat. No doubt this country would be willing to send its representatives to sit down with those of North Vietnam to discuss the means of reestablishing peace in southeast Asia. It remains to be seen whether there is in Hanoi any inclination to negotiate a peaceful solution of the kind which the President has suggested.

Those who have been clamoring for negotiations now have their opportunity to direct their message to North Vietnam, upon whose willingness to participate in discussions the realization of the President's peaceful purposes depends. It is to be hoped that they will be successful. If they are not successful, even this country's severest critics will hardly be able to maintain the fiction that the war is being prolonged by American unwillingness to negotiate.

North Vietnam, the Vietcong and China simply must be persuaded that the President was in dead earnest when he said: "We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement." Only the thinnest edge of American military power has made itself felt in Vietnam. There is more where that power came from.

And alongside this expression of determination must be put the President's assurance that the United States wishes nothing for itself but asks only an independent South Vietnam "free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country."

Attitudes in Hanoi, judged by the statements that have been emerging in the official press and radio, are still very hard. Yet the President was right to disregard these uncompromising assertions of hostility and he was wise to indicate the willingness of the United States to discuss without preconditions the means of securing peace. In the form that the President made his gesture, it could hardly be construed as a sign of weakness. Even if the offer of discussions is rejected, nothing has been risked or lost by making it.

If the North Vietnam government is not ready for discussions now, the fight will have to go on until they are ready. For the sake of the people of both North Vietnam and of South Vietnam let us hope they will be ready soon so that an end may be put to a destruction of lives and resources needed desperately for the reconstruction of a country torn by war for more than a decade.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Apr. 8, 1965]

#### THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

President Johnson struck the right note in his speech last night at the Johns Hopkins University. He lifted the discussion of the war in Vietnam from the purely military measures to the higher ground of an American policy that puts the proper emphasis on our desire to search for a peaceful settlement and our readiness to contribute generously to a program of economic development for southeast Asia, which could include North Vietnam.

The President thus has supplied what, to many Americans, seemed to be a missing element in previous official explanations of the United States policy. His speech does not mean that peace will be established at once, since the Communist side has yet to show whether it is ready even to discuss a settlement, but it widens the approaches to negotiations and it thus strengthens the United States position.

Mr. Johnson repeated his earlier statement that the United States would never be second in the search for peace and went on to declare that "we remain ready—with this purpose—for unconditional discussions." This is an important move forward from previous indications that discussions would be agreed to only after the Communist side stopped its aggression against South Vietnam.

The President was explicit in saying that he will ask Congress to "join in a \$1 billion American investment" in the economic development of southeast Asia when peace is assured, and in expressing his hope that U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, will use the prestige of his office and

his own knowledge of Asia to initiate, "as soon as possible," with the countries of Asia a plan for cooperation in increased development. This helps to make it clear to Asians, as well as to others, that the United States is concerned first with peace rather than with military action.

In the President's speech there is an inducement for the Communists to end the war and an inducement for other governments to join in the effort to obtain a settlement. The present military action by the United States will continue, and it should be noted that the President pointed out that patience and determination will be required to see it through, but everyone concerned should now have a better understanding of our policy and purpose.

We can all agree with the President's statement that we have no wish to see thousands of Asians or Americans die in battle, or to see North Vietnam devastated, and approve his promise that our military power will be used with restraint and "with all the wisdom we can command."

[From the Philadelphia (Pa.) Inquirer, Apr. 9, 1965]

#### WITH COURAGE AND REASON

President Johnson's address at Johns Hopkins University—directed to America and the world, to our friends and our enemies—was a masterful presentation of U.S. policy in southeast Asia.

It is a policy that calls for continuing courage in the defense of a far-off land against the aggression of a brutal invader. It is a policy that summons the forces of reason in quest of peace even though the foe is notoriously unreasonable and seemingly committed to the path of war.

The President balanced a strong pledge to defend freedom in South Vietnam with an equally strong promise to seek a fair peace through unconditional discussions. He capped it all with a billion-dollar offer of economic development aid to southeast Asia that ought to serve as a persuasive inducement to end the war and reap the harvest of peaceful progress.

While there were overtones of idealism in his speech the President also faced the hard truths and the harsh realities—something that many of his critics have been too timid to do.

"We must deal with the world as it is," Mr. Johnson said. "The first reality is that North Vietnam has attacked the independent nation of South Vietnam. Its object is total conquest. To abandon this small and brave nation to its enemy—and to the terror that must follow—would be an unforgivable wrong."

It was on this note that Lyndon Johnson rose to the pinnacle. His policy is based on what is right rather than on what is expedient. His firm voice of compassion for the victims of Communist terror in South Vietnam comes as a refreshing breath of hope in a world where many people and many countries are all too willing to pass by on the other side and leave the oppressed and the tormented to their horrible fate.

President Johnson emphasized that "we will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement."

This was a well-deserved rebuke of those who clamor for negotiations on any terms. What they really are seeking is a way to surrender.

If Hanoi is ready to talk peace, it has an open invitation. America's terms, as stipulated by Mr. Johnson, are eminently fair and clear: "An independent South Vietnam, securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others."

Whether the Communists will consider these terms acceptable is another matter. It takes two to negotiate.

[From the Washington Evening Star, Apr. 8, 1965]

#### VIETNAM PEACE TALKS

A great deal of emphasis has been put on President Johnson's use of the word "unconditional" in connection with discussions looking toward a settlement of the Vietnam war. And the administration evidently wanted it that way.

When read in context, however, this phrase does not seem to mean anything greatly different from what has been said in the past. For Mr. Johnson also emphasized that a peaceful settlement "demands an independent South Vietnam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country. These are the essentials of any final settlement." If the President means this, and we believe and hope that he does, his references to unconditional discussions presumably is nothing more than a statement of willingness to discuss such a peaceful settlement without insisting upon an end to the Communist aggression or upon some "signal" from the Reds before we will even discuss peace. Thus, the use of the term "unconditional discussions" may be new in a semantic sense, but the President has said essentially the same thing privately on many occasions in the past.

The great danger lies in the possibility that the stated readiness to enter into "unconditional discussions" will be interpreted as a hint that we are weakening or wavering in our commitment to freedom for South Vietnam. We do not think that the President meant to convey any such impression and other portions of his speech support this belief. For example, he said: "We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement." And again: "Our resources are equal to any challenge. \* \* \* We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom we can command. But we will use it."

It is hard to see how the case could be stated in plainer language. We are in Vietnam, as Mr. Johnson said, because if the battle is not fought there to a satisfactory conclusion, it will have to be fought on some other ground. And militant communism, in the long run, is hardly less of a threat to the United States than to Asia.

So this is a speech which should, and which of course will be, read with care in every capital of the world. The headline emphasis on unconditional peace talks and the hope for a brighter economic future, which the President also outlined, deserve close attention. But the same thing is true, if not more true, of the tough sections.

#### THE LATE GENERAL JOHN HESTER

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it was with deep regret that I learned yesterday of the death of Gen. John Hester, an outstanding officer and a fellow Montanan. His death came as a result of injuries suffered when his parachute failed to open properly during a practice jump in West Germany. General Hester, in keeping with his strong sense of responsibility and dedication to duty, had gone to jump school in order to gain a better understanding of the Air Force's role in providing support for the Army. This jump which led to his death was the last of his series of five.

General Hester has had a long and distinguished career in the service of his country. His death, therefore, is a loss to the country as well as a heavy personal loss to his family and friends.



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From his first assignment as second lieutenant in 1938, to his last duty as commander of the 17th Air Force, he served with great devotion and ability. In China, during World War II, he flew 50 combat missions in fighters and bombers. His staff work ranged over a wide variety of assignments, including that of aide to the then Secretary of the Air Force, Stuart Symington, the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. President, I am sure that I speak for many others when I express my deep sorrow at General Hester's death and extend my sympathy to his family.

#### EAST COAST MODEL UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, this weekend, April 9 to 11, Newburyport High School, in Newburyport, Mass., will act as host to 750 students and faculty members from 8 east coast States who are participating in the 8th annual east coast model United Nations conference.

The program of the conference will be patterned after the United Nations itself, and will include committee meetings and a plenary session. The participants will hear talks, by foreign-affairs experts, on several issues of timely importance. Speakers include George C. Enninfu, the bureau chief of the Ghana News Agency, whose topic will be "An African Looks at the World"; and Leon Vokov, the Soviet affairs expert of Newsweek magazine, whose topic will be "The Great Schism Between Russia and China."

I ask unanimous consent that an article describing the conference, which was published on April 4 in the Boston Sunday Herald, be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The interest being shown by these young people in the problems of international relations is certainly worthy of our praise. The issues with which they will be concerned are important to all of us. In developing this program on the activities of the United Nations, the students are presented with an excellent opportunity to increase their awareness of the domestic problems faced by the countries they have chosen to represent and to gain a broader understanding of the basic causes of international tensions and the machinery which the U.N. organization has set up to deal with them. Furthermore, they can become better acquainted with the agencies within the framework of the U.N. which work to alleviate human suffering and to raise the standards of living in the developing nations.

As a Senator from Massachusetts, I am proud that Newburyport High School has been chosen as the locale for this year's conference. I extend my congratulations to all of the faculty members and students from the participating high schools for undertaking this worthwhile project. I know it will be most informative and interesting for all who attend.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Boston Herald, Apr. 4, 1965]  
NEWBURYPORT HIGH TO HOST EAST'S MODEL U.N. MEETING

NEWBURYPORT.—East Coast Model United Nations Conference will be held at Newburyport High School on Friday and Sunday, with 750 students and faculty members expected to attend from eight east coast States.

This will be the Eighth Annual East Coast Model U.N. Parley. Principal Francis T. Bresnahan of Newburyport High said the school is probably the smallest one to host the gathering and Newburyport itself is the smallest place. But he said wonderful support is being given by the community.

Families from Newburyport and immediate area responded fast to an appeal to provide Friday and Saturday night lodging, and Saturday and Sunday breakfasts for the visitors.

The conference will be modeled after the United Nations, with committees and a plenary session.

The opening committee session will be at 3 p.m. Friday. At the evening program, an address on "An African Looks at the World," will be given by George C. Enninfu, bureau chief of the Ghana News Agency, the first African journalist accredited to the United Nations.

Saturday night at the National Guard Armory, Leon Vokov, Soviet affairs expert of Newsweek magazine, will talk on "The Great Schism Between Russia and China."

Chris McGillivray, senior at Newburyport High, is secretary general of the conference. Newburyport will represent two countries, Malawi and Finland.

Last year's host school, Mount Vernon, N.Y., will represent the Soviet Union. First choice of a country goes to the host of the preceding year.

The conference won't be all serious business. One highlight will be a barbecue in World War Memorial Stadium Saturday afternoon. The plenary session of the model General Assembly will be held Sunday morning.

Two schools not in the conference were given permission to send observers who will be from "countries outside the United Nations." Oxford Hills High School of Norway, Maine, will be the Peoples Republic of China, Paul D. Schreiber High School of Port Washington, N.J., will be the Palestinian Government-in-exile.

The States represented are Delaware, Rhode Island, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York with the District of Columbia.

Some preparatory and private schools are participants. Some Bay State schools in the model United Nations are Needham High, representing both Yemen and Saudi Arabia; Newton South High, Australia; Weymouth High, Cyprus; Haverhill High, Dominican Republic; Noble and Grennough School, Hungary; Dana Hall School, France.

Beaver Country Day School, Laos; Newton High, Netherlands; Cardinal Cushing Academy of West Newbury, Bolivia; Hingham High, Ghana; Lawrence High of Falmouth, Tanzania and Zambia; Governor Dummer Academy, Sudan; Winchester High, Tunisia.

#### SENATOR BREWSTER'S ADDRESS TO THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY REUNION OF THE OFFICERS OF THE 6TH MARINE DIVISION

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, on April 1, 1945, the 6th Marine Division landed at Green Beach, on Okinawa. One of our colleagues, the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER], commanded a rifle platoon in the assault wave.

Twenty years later, on last Saturday, Senator BREWSTER addressed the 20th anniversary reunion of the officers of the 6th Marine Division, at Quantico, Va. Although many years had passed, I think it still serves a useful purpose not only to recount campaigns of World War II, but also to review the status of the armed services of the United States today.

Our distinguished colleague, Senator BREWSTER, was the youngest commissioned officer in the entire Marine Corps in the earlier days of World War II. He commanded a company in battle before he was 21; he was wounded some six or seven times in four different engagements; he received the Purple Heart, the Gold Star in lieu of a second Purple Heart, and the Bronze Star.

Senator BREWSTER's words and his toast to Gen. Lemuel Shepherd, then the commanding general of the 6th Marine Division, and later the Commandant of the Marine Corps, have particular significance now, when two reinforced Marine battalions are committed in South Vietnam, and perhaps other Marines may be on the way.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, Senator Brewster's remarks at the 20th anniversary reunion of the officers of the 6th Marine Division. They do credit to our brave colleague and to the morale of the Marine Corps.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SPEECH BY SENATOR BREWSTER, FOR 6TH DIVISION REUNION, QUANTICO, VA., APRIL 3, 1965

Gentlemen, I'm sure you find it as difficult as I do to believe that 20 years have passed since the memorable Easter Sunday morning when our division landed over Green Beach and captured Yontan Airfield. It is with a lump in my throat that I recall the events that followed our landing as L Company, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, moved up the Ishikawa. Our company, led by Capt. Nelson C. Dale, moved at the head of the column up a ravine west of Yontan. Lt. Marvin Plock had the platoon on the left. Lt. "Swede" Hedahl had the platoon on the right, and my platoon moved up the center. I had hardly cleared the neck of the ravine when the whole hillside above erupted with enemy fire. Captain Dale was hit and mortally wounded. "Swede" Hedahl was hit and had to be evacuated. I was hit twice and found myself and my platoon almost hopelessly pinned down. Lt. Marv Perskie, our executive officer, took command of the situation at this point. "Let's go, men." With this command, Perskie battled his way forward, using rifles, hand grenades, flame throwers, and guts. Marv's sudden, devastating attack overran the Japanese position and permitted what was left of my platoon to walk out of a mighty tight spot. This was the beginning of the battle for Okinawa, a battle which lasted for 100 days, a battle which took us from the landing beaches opposite Yontan to the northernmost tip of the island.

From the north, this tiger's cub of a division was called upon to turn south, where it fought across the Asa Gawa River. After many days of bloody battle, it captured Sugar Loaf Hill, where we lost 2,260 officers and men, killed or wounded, in a 10-day period of time. This battle is already re-

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corded in history alongside Iwo's Mount Surabachi, Peteliu's Bloody Nose Ridge, Tarawa's Betio Beach, and the Battle of the Tenaru, on Guadalcanal.

I would like at this time to pay special tribute to the memory of such men as Major Courtney, Rusty Golar, "Fighting Irish" Murphy, and Lt. Bob Nelson, all of whom chose Sugar Loaf for a valiant last stand, and who gave their all for corps and country on this hallowed ground. From Sugar Loaf, the division captured Naha, made an amphibious landing in Colonel—about to be brigadier general—Metzger's amphibious vehicles, and captured Oroku Peninsula. Our division ended the campaign by raising the American flag on the southern tip of Okinawa.

There can be no doubt about the place the fighting 6th Marine Division holds in history. Formed in the field—composed of battle-tried veterans, and brilliantly led by our distinguished division commander, Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., it will hold a place, not only in history but in our hearts, for all times. As we reflect not only on the exploits of our division, but on the pain, the tears, the suffering of marines under fire, as they watched their comrades fall, die, with bodies shattered, and who, doubtless wounded themselves, had too much pride and devotion to corps and country to lay down their rifles and leave the battle, it is with respect that we pay tribute tonight to those men who are no longer with us on this occasion of the 20th year after our landing on Okinawa.

We are all quite familiar with our Marine Corps that ended World War II 20 years ago—the Marine Corps of which our division was a part. What about the Marine Corps today? The thought occurred to me that many of us would like to know what has happened in these past 20 years—years in which we have been engaged in a so-called cold, or limited, war environment. In fact, I am sure that many of us have wondered what effect, if any, the age of thermonuclear warfare has had on our corps. During the next few minutes I want to bring you up to date by highlighting the mission, organization, and activities of the Marine Corps. The role of the Marine Corps today is specified in law. It is charged with providing landing forces of combined arms, both air and ground, for service with the Navy's fleets. It is also required to devote primary attention to the advancement of tactics, techniques, and equipment used by any landing force in an amphibious operation. In less formal terminology, its real reason for being, then, is to provide Marine air-ground teams, capable, on short notice, of being projected ashore at any place—it is indeed a force-in-readiness—ready to land either by small boat or helicopter any place in the world today that the situation requires.

To be certain that it can perform this task, at any time, the Marine Corps believes in deploying and training as many of its units as far forward as possible.

The Marine Corps is composed of 193,000 officers and men and is exceedingly proud of the fact that 60 percent of this number are serving in the operating forces, the combat units of the Fleet Marine Force.

There has been only one major organizational change to the corps structure since you and I knew it years ago. The major combat force today is the division/wing team—Marine expeditionary force (MEF). This organization integrates a Marine division and Marine aircraft wing under a single commander. This is in contrast to having a wing in support of a division as you and I knew it during World War II. This means that we now have within a Marine expeditionary force a division headquarters, three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and necessary ground support units. In addition, we have the integrated tactical avia-

tion elements required to support a Marine division, consisting of a wing headquarters, fixed wing, helicopter, and antiaircraft squadrons. These provide offensive air, assault helicopter, aerial reconnaissance, and antiaircraft protection for the force. The Marine Corps has the capability today to field three such teams, together with the necessary command and support units. In case of all-out war, it will constitute a fourth division/wing team from Reserve units. Although the structure of each division/wing team encompasses a force of some 38,000 troops, and appears to be large, the Marine Corps retains the capability of task organizing smaller units for specialized mission. In other words, the corps has the capability to effect combat on a large scale, or on a small scale, as the situation requires.

I am sure that many of you have wondered, as I have, what effect the thermonuclear capabilities of the major combatant forces of the world have had on our corps past and present. For one thing, the corps met the challenges of a possible nuclear war by developing the vertical envelopment concept. That is the use of helicopters to gain greater dispersion of both ships and personnel. We have amphibious assault ships LPHS (all helicopter carriers) in the fleet today that carry a battalion of marines and the helicopters required to land them. In addition to dispersion and greater safety, helicopters permit our marines to outflank obstacles in most instances rather than to meet them head on in a frontal attack as we had to do so often during World War II.

I would say that the threat of nuclear warfare has created an even greater need for the corps today than ever before. The United States must be able to operate under this nuclear umbrella to meet emergency situations as they arise short of all out nuclear war. The deployment of Marine Corps forces since World War II has been designed to do just that. For example, the Marine Corps has had a battalion landing team afloat in the ships of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean since before the Korean war. The call for marines to land at Inchon in 1950 made it necessary for one of these battalions to proceed eastward through the Suez to join its parent regiment off the Korean coast. The Lebanon crisis of 1958 brought this segment of the Marine Corps team, and others from the east coast of the United States, into action. Last October, this unit participated with other stateside navy and Marine forces, and the Spanish Marines, in a major amphibious exercise in Spain.

In the Western Pacific, aboard ships of the 7th Fleet is another special landing force. Its home base is Okinawa, and it can be rapidly reinforced by other units of the 3d Division. This has often been required in the recent days of unrest in the Far East. At the request of the Thai Government, in the spring of 1962, this afloat battalion landed in Thailand, these marines remained there for several weeks, until national integrity was no longer in jeopardy, and the crisis had abated. This same force landed two battalions in Vietnam only last month.

The third afloat unit is deployed in the Caribbean, ready on extremely short notice to effect any one of several contingency plans. This battalion was, of course, one of the first to reach Guantanamo in October 1962. Other potential troubles in any one of several countries touching these waters keep this unit at the constant ready.

The varied capabilities of today's Marine Corps team-in-readiness, as exemplified by these particular units, give the United States a priceless strategic option. When trouble is brewing, a force can be blended together to meet the threat. The amphibious task force, without concern for overflight or base rights, is a flexible, usable instrument of national policy, available for quick reaction and pos-

sible commitment along vast areas of shoreline.

I think we can all take pride in the fact that Marine Corps posture is good and its readiness is excellent. Even so the corps continues to train to seek improvements. During the past year air-ground teams, together with the amphibious forces of the Navy, conducted amphibious assault exercises almost all over the world—excluding only those shores where they are obviously not welcome. These exercises varied in size from battalion landing teams to division-wing teams, organized for the purpose into a Marine expeditionary force. One of the latter, called back pack, involved the third MEF, made up of elements from the 3d Division and 1st wing. From their home bases in Okinawa and Japan, these units landed in Taiwan last March. Marines from the east coast and from the MED landed, as I mentioned earlier, in Spain, in October. The corps has just completed a corps-size amphibious landing, called Silver Lance. This exercise was under the command of Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak—former G-3 of the 6th Marine Division—who now commands the Fleet Marine force, Pacific. The primary test objective of this exercise was the employment of Marine Corps forces in a counterinsurgency environment.

Of course, one of the largest operations, in terms of time and manpower expended, has been going on in southeast Asia since April 1962. It was then that the 1st Marine Corps Helicopter Squadron arrived in Vietnam and began providing support to the South Vietnamese forces, in their struggle against the Vietcong. These marines and their helicopters have given a means of transportation that goes over the jungle rather than through it. Marine Corps helicopter units and Marine Corps advisers to Vietnamese Marine and Army units were joined in February by Marine Corps Hawk antiaircraft weapons, and again in March two battalions of Marine Corps ground troops landed at Danang in Vietnam. Some people have expressed surprise that our Marine forces in Vietnam are for defensive purposes only. However, I know of no other means that could be more forceful in impact than to have U.S. marines reinforce the policies of the United States.

The fact that our marines are continuing to uphold the traditions of our corps, of selflessness and self-sacrificing service, is attested to by their actions as exemplified by Major Koelper, who, as a military adviser to the Vietnamese, and while on leave from his front-line combat unit, gave his life to aid in saving a large number of theater patrons in Saigon. Major Koelper's citation, for which he was awarded the Navy Cross posthumously, reads as follows:

"For extraordinary heroism in connection with the bombing of the Capitol Kinh-Do Theater in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, on the evening of February 16, 1964. Upon becoming aware of a bomb being placed in the lobby of the theater, Major Koelper, who was standing nearby with a companion, unhesitatingly entered the main area of the theater and shouted to the occupants, U.S. servicemen and their dependents, to take cover. This warning provided the time for numerous unsuspecting individuals to obtain cover by lying between rows of seats. Seconds later the bomb exploded, fatally wounding Major Koelper and another person, and injuring approximately 60 others. Through his prompt and courageous actions in warning the theater patrons of the imminent explosion, Major Koelper undoubtedly saved many Americans and Vietnamese from serious injury or possible death. His self-sacrificing efforts were in keeping with the highest traditions of the U.S. naval service."

You may say this is a strange way to die for your country, for an ideal, and yet Major

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Koelper died for what he believed in just as much as did any American in any war in which the Nation has been involved. The attitude of Major Koelper's wife is a touching and as heroic as his deed. She said, "If my husband had to die, I'm glad he died as a marine in the service of his country for what he believed in."

In the face of an unsettled world, with crisis after crisis in Cuba, Panama, Cyprus, and Vietnam, and in all the shadows where there lurks the ugly threat of communism; in the face of those who say the vital values have been relegated to the scrap heap; to those who say that the courage of our people—proved again and again from Valley Forge, and, yes, through Gettysburgh, through the trenches in France, through the islands of the Pacific, through the mud and cold of Korea—and now in the pest holes of Vietnam; to those who say that all this has been squandered in fear and appeasement and in international cowardice—I say—That so long as we have men like Major Koelper and people who believe as his family does—and so long as there are those who are ready and willing to act on these beliefs—we have nothing to fear.

## HARD CHOICES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, recently I had the pleasure of reading a speech delivered at Southern Methodist University, in Dallas, by Joseph J. Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. In his speech, entitled "Hard Choices at the U.N.," Mr. Sisco reminds us that skeptics have been predicting the failure of the United Nations ever since it was founded. Yet, that organization continues to play an indispensable role in world peacekeeping and economic development. I ask unanimous consent that this fine speech be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

## HARD CHOICES AT THE U.N.

(Address by Joseph J. Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, at the Dallas Regional Foreign Policy Conference at Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex., Feb. 27, 1965)

I happen to be married to a Texan, and I find she appreciates plain talk. So do I. So I am going to do some plain talking about the U.N. here today.

For weeks the newspapers have been reporting on the latest crisis at the U.N. Just last week the 114-nation General Assembly adjourned until September without dealing with its annual agenda—an agenda loaded with new issues and hardy perennials. The news weeklies and cartoonists have had time to size up the situation and again raise the question: Will the U.N. survive?

This is not the first time this question has been asked in the 20-year history of the United Nations. And it won't be the last. Just the other night, for example, I was checking something in the 1948 volume of "United States and World Affairs," published annually by the Council on Foreign Affairs. Chapter 10 was entitled "Crisis at the U.N." That was after the first 2 years of the life of the Organization.

Since then the United Nations has been sanctified and buried more times than any institution in history. Somehow we Americans seem to have an affinity for characterizing problems as crises. At the same time, we tend to expect each problem and crisis

to be resolved by some single convulsive act—a summit meeting—some kind of a showdown with a yes-or-no, fish-or-cut-bait answer. We tend to expect the U.N. to usher in perpetual peace or collapse to the ground. We oversold the U.N. at its birth; and today we tend to underestimate its resilience and adaptability as it faces new problems.

But usually the world doesn't work that way. The showdown doesn't necessarily come. The fish-or-cut-bait situation does not too often arise. We keep saying that this or that situation can't continue any longer—and somehow it manages to continue for quite a bit longer. The U.N. neither rises to heights of greatness nor crumbles to ashes. In other words, it's a political organization.

In the past 20 years the United Nations has faced a whole series of external and internal crises. It is a reflecting of our times. In one way or another, it has survived them all. And in the process we have learned that neither the U.N. nor any other instrument of diplomacy can provide a quickie answer to our international problems. The job of peace is a hard day-by-day nuts and bolts process that requires patience and prudence, firmness and resolve.

None of this is meant to deprecate the fact that the United Nations is, in fact, in the throes of a constitutional crisis. Critical decisions lie ahead for the United Nations. The mere fact that it has survived crises in the past does not in itself prove that the present issue will be resolved in a satisfactory way.

Obviously the United Nations could falter—could slip back on the road toward a workable system of world order which we and most of the members have been trying to construct out of the concepts and principles of the Charter and out of the institutional framework it established. This would not be in our national interest. So plain talk requires us to say that the United Nations is once again in trouble.

## NOT A LIFE-OR-DEATH ISSUE

But the point I want to make here is that the present crisis at the United Nations is not presently and need not be a life-or-death affair for the Organization.

Twenty years after World War I the League of Nations was dead. Twenty years after World War II the U.N. is in difficulty but far from dead.

I believe we have learned the lesson of the failure of the League of Nations. But it is well to remind ourselves that this lesson must be constantly relearned—it must be nurtured by the day-to-day effectiveness of the Organization or the U.N. may well become less relevant to our times.

The disability at the U.N. today is in the General Assembly. The Assembly is an important part but by no means all of the Organization.

The Security Council, which the charter says is the "primary" organ for dealing with peace and security problems, is still functioning. As a matter of fact, the Council had one of its busiest years in the life of the U.N. in 1964. In those 12 months, it had over 100 meetings, about one for every 3 days in the year.

It successfully organized the difficult peacekeeping operation in Cyprus. As a result, we have avoided, for the time being at least, a direct military confrontation between two of our closest NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

The Security Council gave the Secretary-General a mandate to assist the United Kingdom and Yemen to resolve their differences over the Yemen-Aden border.

It sent a commission to look into the Cambodian-South Vietnam situation.

It recently called for a stop to outside interference in the Congo and is trying to help promote a peaceful solution there.

It let some steam out of the Kashmir dispute and the question of apartheid in South Africa by handling two new rounds in these bitter disputes.

Meanwhile, those U.N. soldiers of peace in the blue berets are on duty right now between warring ethnic communities in Cyprus—and on the truce line in the Gaza Strip—and on the borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors—and in Kashmir between India and Pakistan—and on the armistice line at the 38th parallel in Korea. These important field operations of the U.N. remain largely unaffected by the U.N. crisis. And we can all sleep more securely tonight because they are there.

What's more, about 80 percent of all the personnel of the U.N. and its affiliated agencies are working in the economic and social and technical fields in a range of specialized agencies and commissions and projects in over a hundred countries and territories.

Many of these agencies are deeply involved in the long-term task of helping the lesser developed nations move toward modern societies—by surveying resources, developing teaching skills, and transferring technology and know-how in agriculture, fishing, industry, transportation, public health, education, administration and other fields.

And still others are engaged in operations and regulatory work which is either done at the international level or not at all—like creating safety standards for international aviation and allocating radio frequencies for international use—like the global elimination of malaria and the design of a world weather watch.

However, the General Assembly sorts out its present problems, these extensive parts of the United Nations system are going on without interruption.

In an interdependent world in which peace—politically, economically and socially—is indivisible, such activities continue to serve the national interest of the United States. An inactive Assembly does not mean the end of such activities.

So in plain fact the United Nations is not dead. And its demise is not in our interest.

What, then, is going on?

## A PERIOD OF PAUSE

On the surface, the crisis in the United Nations is about money. But only on the surface. Arrearages up to \$133 million, of which the Soviet Union owes \$62 million, are nothing to be sneezed at.

But the issue is primarily political. It's been our view, not entirely shared by a number of other U.N. members, that the issue is not primarily between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is an issue between the Soviet Union, France, and a few other countries on one side, and the rest of the members who have shared a general view about world order and the role of the United Nations in creating and sustaining a system of world order.

At first blush the problem is as simple as this:

1. The charter says in perfectly plain language, in article 17, that "the expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the members as apportioned by the General Assembly."

2. The charter says in perfectly plain language, in article 19, that any member more than 2 years in arrears in its assessments "shall have no vote in the General Assembly."

3. For several years the Soviet Union has refused to pay for the Middle East or the Congo peacekeeping operations. Later the Soviets said they did not have to pay because peacekeeping expenses are not proper expenses of the organization and therefore the Assembly does not have the authority to levy assessments to pay for them. Thus they raised a constitutional issue—a question of law.

4. This constitutional question was put to the constitutional court of the United Nations—the International Court of Justice: the question was asked whether costs of peacekeeping in the Middle East and the Congo were “expenses of the organization” within the meaning of the article 17 of the charter? The Court said yes: these peacekeeping expenses are expenses of the Organization within the meaning of the charter.

5. By an overwhelming majority, the General Assembly formally accepted the opinion of the Court—thus explicitly making the statement of law the policy of the Assembly as well.

Most members who were within the reach of article 19 accepted this and paid up their back assessments—or at least enough to remove them from the penalty of losing their votes in the Assembly. But not the Soviet bloc, France, and a very few others.

It was up to the General Assembly to decide whether to apply the loss of vote sanction of article 19 against the delinquents or whether to abandon the sanction and thus undermine the authority of its own assessment function.

Yet this is precisely what the General Assembly declined to do. The General Assembly decided not to decide—at least for the time being.

Clearly the General Assembly did face a fork in the road. If the Assembly moved down one branch and applied article 19 to the delinquents, two major powers might get up and walk out of the Assembly with unforeseeable consequences and possible damage to the Organization. Looking down this road, it seems fair to say that a number of members did not like what they saw ahead.

If the Assembly moved down the other road and set aside article 19 to allow the delinquents to vote, this would undermine its assessment authority. Looking down this road, it seems fair to say that most members did not like what they saw in that direction either.

It was a disagreeable, hard choice, like so many in international politics today. No one interested in the future of the Assembly could face it with any relish.

The Assembly could not bring itself to make a choice. It neither applied article 19 nor relinquished it. It was neither willing to enforce the concept of collective financial responsibility in practice nor abandon it in principle. While the Assembly retains its residual right under the charter to organize and finance peacekeeping operations, it has not been willing to date to force two major powers to pay for peacekeeping operations which these powers disapprove. It did what limited business it could without taking a vote. Then it decided to put the Assembly on ice for the time being—to recess, to buy more time for further negotiations.

So, the plain fact is that there is now a period of pause in the affairs of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

A pause is not a retreat—nor yet an advance. It is time—time that has to be used well if it is not going to work against the building of an effective, operational United Nations. What Emerson said about saving money can be adapted to the pause in the U.N.'s affairs: “Economy does not consist in saving the coal, but in using the time while it burns.”

#### SOME HARD DECISIONS ABOUT CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES

Yet the issue remains. Some time has been gained to work on the critical constitutional and financial problems but the shape of the problem is unchanged.

Both sides of this dispute insist that they stand on principle. And this is important to understand because the conflicting principles involved stem from conflicting views about the United Nations—which is to say conflicting views about the elements of international order.

The U.S. view is that the Charter of the United Nations is a treaty obligation and affords the framework for an evolving system of international law and order which should be upheld and expanded by custom and by extension as world conditions permit. Our view is that while the Security Council is the primary organ for keeping the peace, this overriding duty of the Organization must not be limited to occasions when unanimity prevails among the five major powers and that the General Assembly therefore must be free to exercise its residual rights in the peacekeeping field in emergency situations when the Security Council is unable to act because of the veto. In our view, the charter did not intend to have the veto inhibit voluntary peacekeeping operations of the kind the U.N. undertook in the Congo and in the Middle East—where troops were supplied by members voluntarily and deployed on the territory of a member with its consent.

Our view is that the road to a workable system of world order is lined with international institutions with independent executive capacities for carrying out operations authorized by their memberships according to their own agreed procedures. Our view is that in any healthy international institution all the members must be willing to apply the ground rules—whatever they may be—consistently and impartially to all.

The Soviet view is, and has been, quite different. It contends the United Nations should act to keep the peace only when the five major powers agree on what to do and how to do it and how to pay for it; that the Security Council therefore has exclusive authority in the peacekeeping field, that the function of the General Assembly should be limited to the role of static conference machinery; and that the rest of the U.N. system should do very little by way of operational programs or acquire executive capacity.

For 20 years the United States and the Soviet Union and the United Nations and its members have been able, one way or another, to live with conflicting views and conflicting principles about the proper role of international organization in creating and maintaining a system of world order. The issue has been circumvented or submerged or put off during all this time; now it has been joined in a serious way.

If there was only one principle involved, it wouldn't be such a difficult problem—but then it wouldn't be world politics either. But there is another problem—how to reconcile the almost sacred principle of one nation, one vote with the earthly reality of vastly unequal resources and responsibility for what happens in the world. As a prominent statesman from a small country said recently, “arithmetic power must not be mistaken for actual power.”

The United States is continuing throughout the entire U.N. system to seek ways to assure that the major supporters have a comparable voice in the management of its operations, whether they are political or economic in nature.

We have suggested, for example, that a finance committee be established by the Assembly on which the major resource contributors would have a greater proportionate representation than they have in the Assembly as a whole. Under this plan, the Assembly could decide how to apportion expenses for future U.N. peacekeeping operations only upon the recommendation of this committee.

The Soviets have been unwilling to accept this. They continue to insist on the Security Council's exclusive role. We cannot accept this negation of the Assembly's power. The Assembly's escape hatch must be available if the Council is hamstrung by the Soviet veto. On the contrary, our aim is not to cancel the Assembly's power but to work for procedures which will promote the most responsible exercise of that power.

For this reason, also, we welcome the action recently taken by the Assembly which encourages the new U.N. trade machinery, whose job will be to deal with the trade problems of the less-developed countries, to proceed by conciliation rather than by voting on issues dividing advanced and newly emergent countries.

If used in good faith, this procedure should further the interests of both the advanced and developing countries. For the resolutions of the new trade machinery will be recommendations only. And it serves nobody's interest to pass resolutions by a majority of less-developed countries addressed to a defeated minority with the real economic power which is not prepared to carry them out.

So in plain fact the U.N. is faced with a double constitutional problem. One involves the principle of collective financial responsibility. The other is an apportionment problem: how nations with highly unequal capabilities for dealing with world problems can effectively work together on those problems on the basis of sovereign equality.

In any event, the General Assembly cannot stand forever—or for long—at this complex intersection looking at the road signs. Perhaps negotiations will show the road to take. For its part, our Government stands ready—as it has for months—to work toward an acceptable solution of the issue.

#### THE UNITED NATIONS IN TRANSITION

This rather painful but professionally fascinating exercise is forcing a lot of people to think hard about the system of world order we have been trying to create—about the role of the United Nations and the meaning of its Charter—and about how well this organization has served the fundamental aims of our foreign policy as it was rushed into the danger spots to put the lid on explosive conflicts, as it has begun to work at the job of knitting together the developed and underdeveloped areas of the world in constructive and common enterprise, as it has performed essential international functions in an age made international by our science and technology.

And as we ponder all this, let us remember that the United Nations system of agencies, like national societies and institutions, inevitably is caught up in a process of transition—the main question being the direction in which it is going to evolve in the near future.

Remember, if you will, that the United Nations has taken on unprecedented tasks—and that many of them represent the most difficult and intractable problems which the world has inherited over centuries of less than perfect management.

Remember, if you will, that the United Nations and its family of agencies has for 20 years been in the process of very rapid and sustained growth—an experience which often leads to periods of pause for reassessment and adjustment.

Remember, too, that the United Nations includes within its membership an extremely disparate range of societies—disparate in power and wealth—in size and experience—in political, social, and economic systems—in cultural heritage and the value systems by which they live. This is inevitable in a near-universal organization and it just makes life that much more difficult in it.

Finally, remember that this organization is not a world government. It is an organization of governments participating by consent. It can move forward only as fast as its members want it to move. It can move only in the direction in which its members want it to move.

So the plainest thing I can say to you about the United Nations is that it is in another crisis; that the stakes are important; that the General Assembly is now in a period of self-imposed pause; that hard choices may still have to be made between conflicting



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principles; that the organization is somehow involved in a process of transition; and that we cannot know at this point how fast or in what direction it will move in the near future but the pace and the direction will be limited and controlled by a will of its members.

It is too early to draw any stark conclusions. Both the overzealous admirers and critics of the U.N. tend to state their conclusions in boldface type. One group regards any criticism of the U.N. as desecration of a religious shrine; the other never fails to point out the yawning chasm between aspirations and accomplishments. Neither group looks at the U.N. for what it is—a reflection of a turbulent and divided world, an arena for the interplay of national power and national interests.

We have been the firmest supporters of the United Nations because, whatever its weaknesses, it has promoted our interests and the cause of peace. Two World Wars, I hope, have taught all of us that world organization is a vital imperative. Peace—political, economic, and social—is too interconnected to do away with international machinery. The problems are worldwide. They require a worldwide attack.

Our influence in the U.N. will be exerted on the side of steady progress within the framework of the charter—under a single set of ground rules impartially applied—by reasonably orderly procedures—and in the direction of workable agencies with reliable capacity to act; for this is the way to promote and protect our national interests, to move toward world order and the world peace which President Johnson has characterized as the “assignment of the century.”

## THOUGHTS ON VIETNAM

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, Prof. Fariborz S. Fatemi has written an excellent article on “U.S. Policy in Vietnam.” The article was published in the March 18 issue of the Wayne State University newspaper. I ask unanimous consent that his thoughtful appraisal be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

“HOPE FOR STALEMATE IN VIETNAM”—FATEMI (By Fariborz S. Fatemi, professor of political science)

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—The following article on Vietnam is the fourth in a series prepared by university faculty members.)

To those who think that every problem or crisis can be solved by military solutions or by “bombing our way to peace,” I call attention to Clemenceau's reputed statement that war was too important to be left to soldiers and generals.

I might add that peace is too precious to be left to amateur columnists and writers of letters-to-editors, who glibly tell us that the issue of the Vietnamese conflict is “freedom” and, therefore, we must “go all out.”

## FREEDOM

Yet, none of these pundits have defined their meaning of this often overused overabused word—“freedom.” Do they mean freedom in the style of Governor Wallace? Stalin? Hitler? Diem? Mao? Etc.

Has anyone ever polled the Vietnamese about their desires or views on freedom? Or for that matter, have they ever been allowed to make a free choice?

In fact, former President Eisenhower tells us in his book, “Mandate for Change,” that had the Vietnamese been given a free choice through elections, “80 percent of the population would have voted for Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader.”

Therefore, my advice to these self-appointed “defenders of freedom” is what Ed Murrow used to say, “When you are unsure of your facts, admit it. When you have no solution to offer, don't pretend you have.”

## SUPPORT

At this juncture, I would like to indicate that I support the administration's objectives in Vietnam which to me seem to be the bringing about of meaningful negotiations.

Seen in this light, the bombings of the North can be called an escalation of diplomacy and not of the war. The United States is forcefully telling the Vietcong, the North Vietnamese and the Chinese that they cannot win this war and the United States will not be forced out.

Our hope is that a stalemate would develop and then a ceasefire agreement could be negotiated. Thereby, we would neither have to leave nor would we have a face a wider war.

## DANGERS

But these are obvious dangers inherent in the present course. First, the basic criteria for a stalemate is stability in Saigon, and as long as the game of musical chairs continues among the South Vietnamese military for leadership, there is little hope that this can be accomplished.

Second, we could be heading down a one-way road which, if followed to its bitter end, could involve the United States in either a major war of attrition or a nuclear war with China and the Soviet Union.

From the beginning of our involvement in South Vietnam, the policymakers—following what Walter Lippmann has called the “Dulles system of Asian protectorates”—committed the often-made tragic mistake of subordinating political considerations to the military and their solutions.

We proceeded quickly to solve the problems of Vietnam by making the country an armed garrison state headed by the corrupt, despotic Diem and his feudalistic officials in the countryside who were completely out of touch with their own people.

## FRENCH

We simply failed to accept the fact that the French suffered their Dienbienphu because of the corruption of their unpopular puppet, Bao Dai, and his regime.

The United States has been unable to grasp the fact that, in Vietnam, important as the military factors are, the political factors are even more important in the long run. A people, who fear and even hate their own government, will not serve either their government or the free world by battling against communism.

Indeed, they will not know that the world is free; they will only see that the United States has fastened a police state upon them.

As the attacks at Pleiku, the enlisted men's housing at Qui Nhon, and Bien Hoa Airbase 2 months ago showed, the people in surrounding areas either collaborated with the Vietcong or chose to turn their backs on us and the Saigon government.

## GREAT WEALTH

There is no doubt that we can continue the current war effort indefinitely for our great wealth will sustain us as long as there is need, and we can even escalate the war to North Vietnam.

But one thing is certain, that is, unless a stable, liberal, and progressive government can be found which will rally the people of South Vietnam behind it, we can hardly hope to see the end of the war.

Therefore, we seem to have two options available besides our present efforts toward creating a stalemate. The first is to strive for a negotiated settlement which would guarantee the neutralization of all the area and protect it from a possible takeover after our withdrawal.

The French are favoring an “international accord excluding all foreign intervention in southeast Asia.”

## NAVAL POWER

They point out the war cannot be won no matter how much air and naval power the United States commits or what reprisals the Chinese may take. This is an internal war that cannot be decided by an outsider, whether it is the United States or China.

The key argument against negotiation is our experience with the 1954 Geneva accord. For we see neutralization as a cover plan for the eventual takeover of the whole area by the Communist forces directed from Hanoi and China. This is the so-called domino theory. But the fallacy of that theory is that countries are not dominos.

## REGIMES

Given stable and popular regimes—not necessarily our client rulers, nor those of Hanoi or Peiping, but neither “hostile to Hanoi or Peiping” or us, in the words of Senator FULBRIGHT—the chances for a reasonable settlement may be good.

The other option would be to escalate the conflict by attacking North Vietnam. But no knowledgeable person would admit that this would in any way solve the political and insurrectionary problems in the South.

As a U.S. general recently said in Vietnam, “If we could cut those supply lines from the North, it would help. But nobody pretends that it would end the war. This is a war in South Vietnam. It is here that the war has to be decided.”

## NUCLEAR AGE

In the nuclear age a great power demonstrates its greatness by restraint, not by rashness. Every strike and counterstrike vastly increases the danger to world peace. It also intensifies the pressures on Peiping and Moscow to become actively involved.

The New York Times editorial of Sunday, February 14, said, “The United States has made its point very forcefully with bombs during the last few weeks. Its power is indisputable. In the light of the strength this country has shown, it can now offer to continue its arguments over a conference table where its power will be undiminished. But the outcome might then be peace instead of war.”

## APPOINTMENT OF KENNETH E. BELIEU AS UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, recently it was my pleasure to join Members of the Senate in confirming the nomination of Kenneth E. Belieu as Under Secretary of the Navy.

Under Secretary Belieu is well known and genuinely admired by Members of the Senate and all others who have had the privilege of working with him. As his many friends expected, his promotion to higher responsibilities by President Johnson and Secretary McNamara has already resulted in further recognition of the high standards of leadership which Secretary McNamara has brought to the upper echelons of the Department of Defense. Secretary McNamara's wisdom in promoting Ken Belieu was the subject of the Hearst Headline Services article entitled “Washington Parade,” written by Milton L. Kaplan, chief of the Hearst Publications, Washington Bureau. In this widely read column, Mr. Kaplan pointed out how Secretary Belieu's presence in this high civilian position within the Department of Defense is further evidence that Secretary

McNamara has, contrary to some unjustified criticism, brought those with combat experience into his team.

Because of the importance of this article and the manner in which it sets forth the soundness of Secretary McNamara's selection of Ken Belieu for higher responsibility, I ask unanimous consent that the article, entitled "Navy's Belieu Knows War," which was published on April 6 in the New York Journal American, be printed in the RECORD.

[From the New York Journal-American, Tuesday, Apr. 6, 1965]

WASHINGTON PARADE: NAVY'S BELIEU KNOWS WAR

(By Milton L. Kaplan)

WASHINGTON.—The man in civvies looked down at the ensign in the San Diego Naval Hospital bed and said, "I know exactly how you feel." A look of skepticism crept over the ensign's face, not surprisingly, for he had lost a leg in a shipboard accident a few days before.

"I know," said the civilian, "because I lost my leg in an explosion in Korea."

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Kenneth E. Belieu leaned over, unbuckle his right leg and handed it to the injured man. Ensign Leroy G. Hudson examined the artificial limb, equipped with sock and shoe, grinned and said: "How about that!"

Belieu went on to assure the ensign, "You can do everything with it, including horseback riding, and you aren't as susceptible to colds—you have only one foot to get wet."

The land mine in Korea ended Belieu's combat experience—in the Army—but the former Army colonel has proved that an artificial leg is no handicap. At 51 he has just been moved up to the No. 2 Navy job, Under Secretary.

Defense Secretary McNamara can, if he chooses, point to Belieu to answer the familiar complaint that there aren't enough men with combat experience at the top in the Pentagon. Belieu's World War II record includes the Normandy landings, Battle of the Bulge, the campaigns in Germany and Czechoslovakia. He was awarded the Silver Star, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Purple Heart, and Croix de Guerre for gallantry in action.

The elevation of Belieu has also helped McNamara's relations with Congress, which have rarely been better than correct. Belieu won wide respect on the Hill in the career he launched after leaving the Army in 1955.

Belieu became a staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee in November 1955 (he had served as executive officer to two Secretaries of the Army after his Korean service). In January 1959, he was named staff director of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, whose chairman was Senator Lyndon B. Johnson.

Belieu also won distinction as staff director of the preparedness investigating subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. With Johnson as chairman and Edwin L. Weisl, New York lawyer, as chief counsel, the committee made possible a cool-headed appraisal of American defenses at a time when cries of anguish were heard over Soviet space achievements.

In 1961, Belieu was named Assistant Secretary of the Navy for installations and logistics. And after he was sworn in recently as Under Secretary, he said, "I think this is the best career ladder an Army type ever had."

#### FREIGHT CAR SHORTAGE

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, it gives me a great deal of pleasure to support S. 1098, by my good friend, the Senator from Washington, Senator MAGNUSON, in which I was joined as a cosponsor.

The diminishing supply of freight cars has been a matter of considerable concern for many years. Critical shortages of increased duration and severity have become almost commonplace on the national transportation scene. As of January 1, 1965, the number of freight cars owned by class I railroads had fallen to 1,550,477, a loss of one-quarter of a million cars since 1947. It is imperative that we end the recurring shortages that have been a national problem for several decades, and which have become progressively worse.

Critical shortages of freight cars have occurred almost every year, especially during peak loading periods. These shortages adversely affect the timber and grain industries as well as many others which are so vital to our Nation's growth and economy. The railroads serving these industries attempt to maintain adequate supplies of equipped rolling stocks, but once these equipped cars are off-line the owning roads have difficulty getting them back. As a result of this practice the timber industry, for example, has been unable to avail itself of the special wide-door freight cars that they must have to send lumber to market.

The primary cause of the freight car shortage, is the per diem structure which governs the use of our Nation's freight car stock.

Since the average daily return of a freight car greatly exceeds the per diem "rental" charge, many roads have found it more economical to operate someone else's equipment than to invest in their own stock. The provisions of S. 1098 would authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to set per diem rates at levels that in the Commission's judgment will encourage the acquisition, maintenance, and efficiency of an adequate freight car fleet.

It is essential that the freight car fleet be increased. The supply has diminished to the level that when freight cars are sent to one area to alleviate a shortage, it creates a shortage in another area. Greater car utilization is certainly desired, but no matter how efficient it becomes, it cannot offset the present shortage in the number of cars. Thus, there must be an economic incentive for purchasing new cars. S. 1098 would provide this incentive.

Many Oregon lumbermen and lumber shippers have communicated with me indicating that the car shortage this year is particularly acute. The lumber industry of my State was hurt enormously by the catastrophic floods of December 1964 and January 1965. The railroad car shortage adds tremendously to the burdens of an industry that is just

beginning to recover from one of the greatest natural disasters in decades.

S. 1098 has my enthusiastic support and I hope that it can be enacted before our freight car shortage becomes worse.

#### FLOOD DISASTER IN THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I rise today to call the attention of the Senate to a major disaster which is now developing in the State of Minnesota and in surrounding States.

Heavy snow on top of a very heavy frost penetration has caused the accumulation of a substantial water pack on the surface of the ground. Recent heavy precipitation with more forecast today and tomorrow, coupled with high temperatures, has caused an advanced runoff and breakup of ice in our major rivers, the Minnesota and the Mississippi. Indications now are that the record high water of 1952 will be equaled or exceeded throughout much of the State. For example, the Minnesota River near Mankato, Minn., is expected to reach a maximum flood stage of over 30 feet. Normal flood stage in Mankato is 18 feet. The highest stage ever recorded at Mankato was 29.9 feet in 1881 and more recently in April 1952, at 26.2 feet.

At St. Paul, Minn., our capital city, predictions are that the Mississippi River will crest as high as 27 feet or higher on the 16th of April. The highest previous stage at St. Paul was 22 feet in April of 1952. Five feet over this record stage of 22 feet would very likely result in tremendous damage and severe flooding in the St. Paul area, and especially in South St. Paul's stockyards and packing plants.

Other rivers in central, west central, and southern Minnesota, in the State of Wisconsin, and in the State of Iowa will also be cresting at record proportions.

The warning signs of this impending disaster were clear to me several weeks ago. Knowing as we did that normal higher temperatures and spring rains could cause severe flooding, Senator McCARTHY and I called together representatives of several Federal agencies to discuss their activities in preparation for the potential danger from floods. Agencies represented in my office at that time were the Office of Emergency Planning, Department of Agriculture, Small Business Administration, Public Health Service, Army Corps of Engineers, and the Red Cross. High level officials of those agencies gave us detailed reports on preparations, personnel already in Minnesota, and assistance available through particular laws governing their operations. We expressed to the representatives at that meeting our very deep concern over the plight of those residents in the threatened areas and received assurances that all possible preparations were being made.

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they do the substance of the President's address and refusing to perceive its vision and its statesmanship.

It was a statement not of retreat but of steadfast determination, all the more steadfast for being reasonable. In proposing discussions without preconditions, Mr. Johnson was emphatically not announcing a cessation of military pressure against North Vietnam; but he was coupling with continued pressure the sensible idea, advanced by Secretary General U Thant, by representatives of 17 unaligned nations who met last week in Belgrade, and by others, that the chance of negotiation might be increased somewhat if rigid conditional positions could be dropped. It is by no means a certainty, perhaps not a probability, but it is a hope; and in any case the United States has now boldly taken the initiative.

As to buying peace and friends with dollars, that is far from what the President said, and far from what he meant. He seeks to offer southeast Asia a program of rehabilitation from which might develop the conditions of peaceful security. Nor is this a proposed dole: for one thing, it involves the development of the Mekong River Valley, a vast project already underway through United Nations sponsorship but moving too slowly, and a project which has for 20 years excited the imagination of the region with its promise of cheap power and of two or three rice crops a year in paddies where one crop now grows. To help with such work is not bribery; it is investment in stability.

Finally, as to the notion that the aim of Mr. Johnson's address was to placate critics calling for negotiations: this is to charge him with hypocrisy, and it is a false charge. He did concede the validity of some of that criticism, but up to a point only, and a point far short of weakness or retreat. He was explaining, clarifying, delivering a broad statement of national policy.

In a situation of immense danger, complexity and difficulty—made no less difficult by new Chinese expressions of lack of interest in a settlement—a firm and generous American policy has now been put clearly before the world, and before the American people.

#### PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH ON VIETNAM

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, the most encouraging and significant development on the international scene was announced Wednesday night by President Johnson, in his speech at Johns Hopkins University, in Baltimore. That speech, of course, is well known to all of us.

The President has, in my estimation, developed a masterly policy on the one hand, he has announced, once again, this country's firm and total commitment to the self-determination of nations, supported by persuasion, where possible, and by force, where necessary. On the other hand, he has opened the way for constructive peacekeeping efforts, through his proposals for unconditional discussions and an American investment in the economic development of southeast Asia.

Nowhere, I think, have I seen a more thoughtful or accurate assessment of the President's newly announced policy than in an editorial entitled "More Carrot, Same Stick," published on April 8 in the New York Herald Tribune. Because of its timely nature, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Apr. 8, 1965]

#### MORE CARROT, SAME STICK

U.S. policy toward North Vietnam has been a combination of the stick and the carrot. Without letting up on the use of the stick, President Johnson last night held out a pretty fat carrot—a \$1 billion American investment for the economic development of southeast Asia which North Vietnam would share. He sweetened the carrot by speaking of an independent, neutralized South Vietnam, "free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country."

He combined this with an offer of "unconditional discussions" for a settlement of the conflict. That should assure friends and foes alike that Washington, far from opposing a negotiated arrangement, is ready to proceed immediately to the conference table without prior conditions by either side—if our opponents are.

Whether this does or does not represent a change in the U.S. position is hardly a subject for fruitful argument. Washington maintained that it would negotiate when the time was ripe. Perhaps the President feels that time has arrived.

He may very well be right. Sooner or later—and it may be sooner than we think—Peiping and Hanoi will have to sue for peace. The time must come—if it has not come already—when they will admit to themselves (never to others) that the game in South Vietnam is up; that the cost of continuing the venture is prohibitive in damage to North Vietnam by conventional American bombs and in potential damage to Communist China by nuclear American bombs; that the venture itself has become highly questionable since the United States directly committed itself to the war against the Vietcong in the south, as well as to a war against North Vietnam, and if necessary against Communist China, from the air.

The problem for both Peiping and Hanoi is how to pay our price, which is the cessation of Communist aggression against South Vietnam, without losing face, bearing in mind that face is about the last thing in the world that an oriental can lose. The device which they may have in mind was indicated in Premier Chou En-lai's message to Secretary General U Thant. It is to pretend that they have had nothing to do with the Vietnamese conflict and to invite the United States to conclude a settlement directly with the Communist Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam.

This, however, is not what Washington has in mind. The President spoke of "discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones." And that is what Peiping and Hanoi want to avoid because public exposure would endanger their face.

One side or the other will have to give ground as to the manner in which the Communist retreat is to be negotiated. But the manner is not as important as the substance, and it is the substance which we seek—the security and independence of South Vietnam and the rest of Asia not now in Communist hands. If Peiping and Hanoi must save face, facilities may somehow be provided. Their true face is perfectly apparent to all.

#### A PROFILE OF JOHN CARVER

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, one of Idaho's most distinguished sons has been the subject of recent biographical articles in several of the newspapers in my State. By virtue of his capability and qualities of leadership, John Carver has moved steadily upward in the field of public service to the position he now holds as Under Secretary of the Interior.

I feel that these attributes are well portrayed in the profile on the Under Secretary that was published in both the Lewiston, Idaho, Morning Tribune, and the Boise, Idaho, Observer.

Therefore, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the profile of March 21, 1965, as published in the Lewiston Morning Tribune, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### IDAHO'S CARVER FLYING HIGH AND HEADING EVEN HIGHER

(By Bryce E. Nelson)

Idaho's John A. Carver, Jr., has several titles; one of his less known is "Tch-aa," which means "High Eagle," given to Carver when he was made Bear Prince of Alaska's Eagle tribe. But, he is better known as the new Under Secretary of the Interior, probably the highest position in the executive branch ever attained by an Idahoan.

Carver's rapid rise through the ranks of the Federal Government has been unusual, but even more unusual is the high regard in which he is held by informed sources, both Democratic and Republican, in Washington and throughout the country. COMPTON I. WHITE, Jr., Congressman from Idaho's First District, often calls Carver "the most efficient man in Washington."

"The best red tape cutter I ever found in Washington is John Carver," explain Senator FRANK E. MOSS of Utah.

Idaho's Republican Senator LEN JORDAN said recently of Carver, "He is a man of great competence and high integrity, knowledgeable in the land and water resources, and has that innate fairness that commands the respect of users of the public lands and public domain, as well as the theorists, the administrators, the wildifers, and all."

Carver was born at Preston, Idaho, April 24, 1918, the eldest of seven children. (His brother, Dr. Terrell Carver of Boise, is Idaho's State director of health. His sister, Mrs. Harold C. Howell, lives at Pocatello; the others live in other Western States.)

Carver's father, now deceased, played a great part in influencing his children's development. The senior Carver, an attorney, was blinded at the age of 5; his wife served as his "eyes" for their long married life, both in his legal practice and in reading all the books necessary for his legal education at the University of Idaho.

In 1928 the family moved to Pocatello, where the senior Carver became prosecuting attorney. "We never had much money," according to the son. "Life was pretty much a subsistence proposition. I don't mean we ever went hungry. Food used to come to us in sacks from my mother's family and my father's family on the farms." The Carvers spent their summers on the family ranch on Mink Creek east of Preston.

In 1933 the family moved to Boise, where John A. Carver, Sr., became U.S. attorney, a position he held for the next 20 years. In 1936, he took his eldest son with him to Washington, D.C., where he was to attend a conference.

"I was 18 and I looked about 14," Secretary Carver remembers. "Some people in Senator Pope's office said that I could easily get a job at Washington. After pounding the pavement for weeks, I finally found a job at Marriott's Hot Shoppes, where I worked 6 weeks until I got a job as a messenger for Senator Wheeler's Committee on Railroad Financing. I finished my sophomore year of college at George Washington University at the same time. My father came back again to Washington the next year and decided that my work at the Senate was interfering with my studies. So I went back west. For transportation, I helped the late

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C. C. Anderson of Boise drive a new Cadillac from Detroit to Boise."

## BACK TO WASHINGTON

After returning west, Secretary Carver compiled an almost straight A average at Brigham Young University, where he received an A.B. degree in 1939. He attended law school at the University of Montana and the University of Idaho and then returned to Washington to work as a Federal civil service personnel executive.

He had a meteoric rise in the civil service, advancing from grade 4 when he entered in July of 1940 to grade 13 in May of 1943, when he entered the military. He was later commissioned in the Air Force and served in England and Japan.

In 1942 he married Ruth O'Connor, a woman of serene beauty and kindness, who is highly respected by all who know her. The Carvers have three children: John A. Carver III, 19, a student at University of Wisconsin; Craig Roger, 16, and Candace Elaine, 13. Secretary Carver is a warm family man, who treasures the moments he can spend at home.

After the war, Carver came back to Washington to finish law school at Georgetown, where he received his LL.B. In 1947, the same year he decided to return to Boise to set up a law practice.

"I guess a person would have to be crazy to have done what I did. I had a good job in the Defense Department, but I decided I didn't want to be a personnel clerk, no matter how well paid. I had a little money saved, enough to eat for 6 months, and I used about all of it in Boise before I really got going."

In addition to opening a law office, Carver obtained a position as assistant attorney general for Idaho, a job he enjoyed and which he held for 18 months.

It was in that post where he first became well acquainted with the present Governor of Idaho, Robert E. Smylie. "He's a very capable guy, and was a good man to work for when he was attorney general," Carver said.

Carver built a successful law practice at Boise before he left in 1957 to become administrative assistant to the newly elected Democratic Senator from Idaho, FRANK CHURCH.

CHURCH recently commented, "As my administrative assistant, Mr. Carver quickly demonstrated that he had the intuition to locate the jugular vein of a difficult problem; that he could organize an office staff \* \* \* and perhaps most of all, that he was dedicated to the public welfare."

After the Democratic victory in 1960, President Kennedy appointed Carver Assistant Secretary of the Interior Department, where he supervised the Bureaus of Land Management, Indian Affairs, Outdoor Recreation, and also the National Park Service, the Office of Territories, and the Alaska Railroad.

Carver's recent promotion to the position of Under Secretary of Interior indicates that he has the confidence of President Johnson and of the Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall, whom Carver respects and with whom he has a close working relationship.

Asked what had surprised him most about his service in the Interior Department, Carver commented, "On a personal level, I was surprised by the breadth of the interests and groups which reacted favorably to my promotion to Under Secretary. I have always thought that there was more to any job than getting your name in the papers, and I tend to forget about public relations. I guess I was unconscious of the fact that the word had spread around that we were getting things done in the public lands sector."

Asked what achievements he most values in his service in the Department, Carver answered, "First, I would like to list the territories area. We have done better than any other administration in giving the U.S. territories the substance of self-government rather than just the form.

"Second, this administration has better relationships with the users of the public lands than anyone would have thought possible, better than the Eisenhower administration, which was supposed to have been business oriented.

"We have this relationship because we start with the philosophy that the users have a legitimate interest in the public lands and we take this into account. We have been able to do this without offending the conservationist groups. But after all, there's more and more interrelationship between these groups—a cattleman for instance, is likely to be a hunter and want our wildlife preserved.

"In some people's minds I have come to be regarded as a champion of the users of the public lands against the conservationist impulses of the Department of Interior. I certainly have given generously of my time and energy to the users of the public lands, but I don't think this categorization is accurate.

"I am in complete accord with the conservationist aims of this Department; I don't think the two interests are incompatible."

As might be expected, one of the prime ingredients of Carver's success is that he is an energetic and diligent worker. He averages a busy 60-hour week and always works a full day on Saturday. This willingness to put in long hours does not characterize all high-level administrators at Washington.

## NO RED CARPETS

As the official who commands the National Park Service, Secretary Carver could receive the red-carpet treatment at any national park or monument; he has often preferred to visit these parks with his family as an ordinary tourist to see how the park's facilities seem from the viewpoint of the user.

One technique Carver thinks is essential for a good administration is "the self-discipline of writing your own speeches. This forces you to sit back and examine your job, and to think harder about what you are doing. I don't mean that I do all the drafting on every statement I make in public, because I don't, but it is very important for me to continually think over the premises on which I operate and to be able to articulate them in my own language."

They also demonstrate Secretary Carver's great interest in and knowledge of the history of the United States, especially that which concerns the American West.

Because of the quality of his public addresses, Carver receives many speech invitations every month from groups throughout the country. His speeches seem to be well received; his address to the State Democratic convention at Idaho Falls in 1962 received a rousing ovation.

Other qualities which make John Carver a popular administrator are the personal honesty and concern he demonstrates to all those around him.

As one former associate commented, "John is so interested in getting the job done that he is sometimes brusque. Actually, he is one of the most compassionate, tender-hearted people I've ever met in my life. He's also a little shy, which few people realize."

Carver has been known to send money from his own pocket to the poverty-stricken who have written to his office. Carver is described as "very considerate" and "quick to applaud if you do a good job," by those who work with him. Another associate comments, "John has a great respect for human dignity."

Carver has represented the Department of Interior in Secretary Udall's absence at Cabinet meetings called by this President on several occasions. Carver is probably the only Idahoan ever to attend Cabinet meetings in an official capacity.

Although Carver is now exercising his talents on a national scale, he still is much concerned about the welfare and development of his own State, which he thinks has

a great deal of undeveloped potential. "Of all the States in our area," Carver explained, "Idaho is unique—first, in our remaining unappropriated water; second, in our undeveloped land; and third, in our richness of forage and timber.

"The main task of political leadership in Idaho is to educate and encourage our State to develop its great potential of physical and human resources.

"We could do much more to encourage tourism and camping in Idaho. As for industry, although we don't have coal or other fossil fuels, we have plenty of water. Name a place that has the water resources we have. We have been more emotional than sensible in our attitude toward our uses of water. We can make our system in Idaho accommodate industrial development."

What does the future hold for this man of great administrative capability, incisive intelligence, broad interests, and concern for human welfare? Is John Carver destined to sit in the Cabinet in his own right, or will he answer the call to seek high elective office in Idaho?

There seems to be a sizable number of Idahoans who think that John Carver might be persuaded to switch his emphasis from conservation to politics and run for an elective office. Judging from the number of Idaho Republican newspapers that have published favorable editorials on Carver's appointment, he might be one Democrat who would attract Republican support. One leading Idaho Republican businessman is reported to have said: "John Carver is one Democrat I could support for Governor."

Carver's Idaho admirers have made themselves vocal. The Lewiston Morning Tribune recently editorialized: "Sooner or later, we suspect, Carver will consider turning from an appointive role in the National Government to seek elective office in his own beloved Idaho. Certainly he would be a superbly qualified candidate for Governor should his interests turn in this direction."

But whether Carver's interests turn toward seeking elective office or not, it is likely that the Idaho State Journal of Pocatello struck a prophetic note when it commented: "Carver is a man for succeeding in his assignments. His position will give him more of a chance to demonstrate his ability. He is still a young man, and Idahoans and the Nation are bound to hear a lot more of John Carver in the years to come."

## OUR CONSERVATION RECORD REVIEWED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLUM

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, a very fine review of the great strides we have made in the past few years in the conservation field is contained in the address made at the biennial convention of the National Farmers Union, in Chicago, on March 17.

We are tackling the need for open spaces, recreational areas, and wilderness. We have made 25 new starts on water and power development projects in the West. An electric power grid is taking shape. Water pollution and atmospheric pollution are getting the attention they merit. We are studying saline water conversion and weather modification. We have started moving forward on many fronts where early answers to resource problems are essential.

I wish to preface Assistant Secretary Holum's address with the comment that he has had a very considerable part in the encouraging progress we have made in the past 4 years in resources fields. A



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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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"Smears, character assassinations, and the scattering of irresponsible charges have no place in this Nation. They create division, suspicion, and distrust among loyal Americans—just what the Communists want—and hinder rather than aid the fight against communism" (p. 290).

Yet, Mr. Welch and the society contend that from 50 to 70 percent of American political and economic life is under Communist control. This might be loosely interpreted as meaning that more than half of us present tonight are dupes of the Communist conspiracy.

If Mr. Welch and the society have in mind the defeat of Communism as their goal—Why is conspicuously less time spent denouncing Communists than is spent denouncing patriotic Americans as Communist or pro-Communist? It is my belief that most far-right extremist action programs are, as irrelevant to the real threat of international communism as the Communist philosophy is to the promotion of freedom, peace, and justice.

And what about the political aspects of the John Birch Society—this defender of Americanism? Mr. Welch laid down the guidelines in the Blue Book. "Finally, and probably most important of all these courses of action, we would put our weight into the political scales in this country just as fast and far as we could. For unless we can eventually, and in time, reverse by political action the gradual surrender of the United States to communism, the ultimate alternative of reversal by military uprising is fearful to contemplate" (p. 110).

Now, over the last few months we have repeatedly been told that the John Birch Society supports no candidate—yet, Mr. Welch states, "We shall have to use politicians, support politicians, create politicians" (p. 121). I do not deny their right to do this—for to me, to deny it would be un-American. But let us look at Mr. Welch's philosophy of government? "The form of government is not nearly so important as its quality" (p. 134). "The greatest enemy of man is, and always has been, government" (p. 138). "Government is frequently evil. And we do not mean by this that they are merely dishonest. For all governments, with very rare exceptions indeed, are thoroughly dishonest" (p. 129). And last—

"Yet I had rather have for America and I am convinced that America would be better off with a government of 300,000 officials and agents, every single one of them a thief, than a government of 3 million agents with every single one of them an honest, honorable public servant" (p. 136).

Is this the philosophy we wish to guide and produce our future politicians?

Recently, in the news, we have heard of the attempts of the John Birch Society to infiltrate the police forces of various major cities. We also know that one of the cherished rules of communism whenever and wherever they became strong enough to exert some force in a government—that one of their first objectives was to take over the police force. Even Mr. Welch alerts us to the "greater temptation to criminality on the part of those who control or influence the police power of a nation" (p. 130).

Mr. Welch, I agree. \* \* \* But I ask you, is it less dangerous for a far-out rightist group to attempt control of the nation's police power—than it is for a far-out leftist organization?

The past president of the Idaho Congress of Parents and Teachers attacked the John Birch Society as anti-American in its attempts to take over the PTA. She charged that the society literature instructs its members on how to gain control of PTA's—by heckling the President, stalling meetings until other members have gone home, and then taking over, and by gaining appointment to the program and publicity committees.

In the September 1960 Bulletin of the John Birch Society, Robert Welch wrote, "Join your local PTA at the beginning of the school year \* \* \* and go to work to take it over \* \* \* when you and your friends get the local PTA groups straightened out, move up the ladder as soon as you can to assert a wider influence \* \* \* and don't let the dirty tactics of the opposition get you down."

And what about the society's pleasant sounding cliché—Let's do away with big government and big government controls? Lessening of restrictive governmental controls does have merit—but is it true conservatism which we hear from the far right? I say no. Let's take for example the proposal we most frequently hear from the rightwing, the liberty amendment. How righteous and patriotic that sounds—the liberty amendment—but what would this so-called liberty amendment do? It would repeal the Federal income tax and prohibit the Federal Government from engaging in "any business, profession, or industrial enterprise except as specified in the Constitution." If we are to be concerned with the threat of international communism—how would you propose to maintain sufficient military force to repel the international Communist conspiracy if you did away with the income tax—the source of revenue so necessary to support any military operation? Excluding the international Communist threat that would be present from the lack of military security, what would this liberty amendment really mean to you and me as citizens of this great land?

It would mean the elimination of all present Federal activity not mentioned by the Founding Fathers in 1783. Out would go the Veterans' Administration, Patent Office, Soil Conservation Service, Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Public Roads, Central Intelligence Agency, Security and Exchange Commission, Federal Communications Commission, and almost 700 other agencies. Out would go Federal grants-in-aid to States for old-age, survivors, and disability insurance—unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation, maternal and child health services, vocational rehabilitation, school lunches, child welfare, protection of fish and wildlife.

All Federal money would be cut off which is now used for land-grant colleges and agricultural extension services, public housing, Federal insurance on crops and home mortgages. None of these activities were mentioned in the Constitution.

Let's get the Government out of the business of government? True conservatism is necessary to the continuance of this Nation—but true conservatism has always been responsible. I ask you, who would grow and prosper under the provisions set forth in the liberty amendment? In 1783, at this country's birth, most children didn't have the opportunity of schools as we know them today. Children worked in factories for 50 cents a week, women couldn't vote and in Idaho when our Constitution was adopted, orientals and members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints were denied the right to vote. Is this what we wish to go back to?

Let me not infer that a situation exists where we can lessen our concern for the atheistic communistic movement. We must not underestimate the dedication and determination of communism. We are told that there are from 10,000 to 15,000 active Communists in the Nation today.

I personally have awakened to the clatter of Communist machinegun fire across the demilitarized zone in Korea. I have seen with my own eyes Communist soldiers preparing fortifications and working on agricultural projects. I was trained and served as an Army anti-Communist intelligence officer. I know the Communists and their methods. We do have to fear what would happen to this Nation if it were to go Communist. For

where communism prevails—faith, freedom, morality, and religion wither.

However, we are also informed by a recent poll that there are about 2 million Americans who align themselves with the extreme rightwing—many of whom I think are well meaning, respectable individuals who actually believe they are fighting communism but are in reality aiding communism by creating division, suspicion, and distrust among loyal Americans.

For as J. Edgar Hoover stated before the Warren Commission: "I think the extreme right is just as much a danger to the freedom of this country as the extreme left. There are groups, organizations, and individuals on the extreme right who make these very violent statements, allegations that General Eisenhower was a Communist, disparaging references to the Chief Justice. \* \* \* Now, I have felt, and I have said publicly in speeches, that they are just as much danger, at either end of the spectrum. They don't deal with facts. Anybody who will allege that General Eisenhower was a Communist agent, has something wrong with him." (P. 595.)

Too often we find many citizens who are completely out of touch with public affairs. Their professions and their home lives, it seems, have absorbed them almost totally. The normal news media holds little or no interest for them. They are conscientious, hardworking, well-meaning citizens, but they seem to feel that they are in a separate compartment of the public that need not concern itself with the rest of the Nation. To them, concern for public affairs should be left to those individuals being paid in the various echelons of government.

It seems hard to believe that so many intelligent, responsible adults could be so disinterested in the world about them. But perhaps, in some measure, this is an inevitable byproduct of freedom—that when a nation is free and strong and responsibly governed, the people become unconcerned with the functions of government because they have become accustomed to expect that all will go well. Their interest is aroused only when something directly affects their daily lives.

Yes, the burdens of government and of life itself today are heavy. But as President Kennedy once stated, "It is the fate of this generation to live with a struggle we did not start, in a world we did not make. But the pressures of life are not always distributed by choice. And while no nation has ever faced such a challenge, no nation has ever been so ready to seize the burden and the glory of freedom."

It would be so refreshing to turn back the clock to the days of old. To their easy life and simplification—but the days of old are past and gone forever. We cannot return even if we wished. So let us not flounder on the rock of reason. Let us go ahead as pioneers, remembering we are Americans, remembering our tried and true American principles, and insuring that historians of the future will not write that these were the years when the tide ran out for the United States.

And as President Eisenhower once stated, "I don't think the United States needs super-patriots. We need patriotism, honestly practiced by all of us."

God bless you all.

## THE VOTING RIGHTS BILL

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I wish to issue a warning against the Senate's plunging headlong into a revision of the voting rights provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which amended and made more stringent the provisions of the acts of 1960 and 1957.

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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

April 9, 1965

Hasty legislation based on the racial emotionalism of the hour is not a sensible or advisable course to follow.

The various civil rights enactments of recent years have been passed over my vigorous protests; but the fact remains that since 1957 Congress has given more time and attention to the subject of voting rights than to any other civil rights subject. We have the laws, but they have not been used sufficiently for an intelligent observation to be made as to whether they are adequate.

Less than 9 months ago, we passed title I of Public Law 88-352, the voting rights part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This act has not been used, except incidentally, by the agitators and demonstrators who constantly cry for more and more legislation, irrespective of what they already have.

What is to be gained by writing new legislation, when existing laws are not used?

I believe in law and order and in respect for the law and the courts. We shall never attain that end by constantly writing new laws just because demonstrators want us to do so.

We should keep in mind that by no means have the courts assumed the attitude that present voting rights laws are weak and unenforceable. On the contrary, and only most recently, the Supreme Court has applied these laws stringently. In the two cases decided on March 8, 1965; namely, Louisiana and others against the United States, and United States against Mississippi and others, the Court made clear that voting patterns and registrations that indicate racial discrimination in the right to vote will not be permitted under existing legislation. At the same time, the Court opened the way for the present laws to be applied against States themselves, not only against localities or counties and the officials thereof. Therefore, State laws and statewide practices that, on their face or by proof in court, show a denial of the right to vote on racial grounds can be nullified under existing laws and procedures.

It is unusual, to say the least, that we are now told by proponents of more and more civil rights legislation that we need a Federal police force of Federal registrars who will just walk in and take over the registration and voting process, which under our form of government is inherently and essentially a matter to be handled by the States. This radical and harsh method of enforcement is not justified by the status of present law.

Enactment of the present proposal would be action reminiscent of reconstruction days, when Federal officials were empowered and directed to rule and govern by individual edict. Such a system is repulsive to the concept of decent government and respect for the law which we have fostered and developed in this great Nation through a genuine and balanced respect for sound government that is not based on individual edicts and the emotionalism of mass demonstrations.

In 1964, voting rights provisions of the law were strengthened so as to give Government aid to aggrieved individuals who

did not care to go into court alone, or who could not afford to do so. Moreover, it permits a three-judge court to hear the matter and to act promptly. In fact, it places voting rights cases in a top priority for immediate consideration, even if a large and important matter is then pending in the courts.

Is it not far preferable to pursue this course and to utilize it fully, rather than to resort to the theory of more legislation, year after year, based on the emotionalism and heated feelings generated in mass demonstrations? I believe that it is; and I will fight against a system of Federal registrars and against any further expansion of the Civil Rights Act.

## L.B.J. ON VIETNAM

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I am delighted that most Americans seem to share my high opinion of President Johnson's speech on Vietnam. Only a few bleary bugles from the Republican side of the aisle struck the note that the President's message might have contained "the trumpets of defeat." The peace of the world depends on rational handling of the Vietnam issue, of the kind reflected in this morning's New York Times. In the lead editorial, entitled, "New Policy, New Phase," this newspaper correctly points out:

So long as the objective was to force Hanoi to give in and openly accept defeat before any discussions could take place, the policy was proving futile as well as dangerous. There was no mention of this demand in Mr. Johnson's address Wednesday; and it seems clear that this aspect of American policy has been dropped. Neither side will accept total defeat and neither side can hope for total victory. The President now wisely repeats—but with new meaning—"we will use our power with restraint."

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Apr. 9, 1965]  
NEW POLICY, NEW PHASE

The applause of the free world and—surely—of a great majority of Americans reflects the fact that in his Johns Hopkins speech on Vietnam, President Johnson has enunciated a new policy and therefore opened a new and hopeful phase of the conflict.

An offer to negotiate without prior conditions, coupled with an offer of vast economic aid, coupled further with a restatement of support for South Vietnam until it is safely independent—these are basic ingredients for an honorable peace. This does not mean that peace will automatically or quickly follow. Hanoi is silent and Peiping has already summarily rejected the Johnson proposals. In Moscow the published account of the speech glaringly omitted the offer of unconditional negotiation. The United States has won a moral battle—mainly with itself—but the war continues.

The Vietnamese conflict is complex and deeply rooted. Vast forces are in motion and there are wheels within wheels—the confrontation of Communist China and the United States, the quarrel between China and the Soviet Union, the struggle between North and South Vietnam and between the Vietcong and Saigon.

Not the least of the elements is what the United States does, as well as what President Johnson says. Mr. Johnson, for instance, said: "We will try to keep the conflict from spreading." This has been said before in the much discredited and often repeated phrase that "we seek no wider war." But then it was accompanied by an obvious widening of the war in territory and intensity. The dangers inherent in escalating solely the military and not the political offensive was responsible to a large degree for the mounting opposition to administration policy in the United States and among our allies.

So long as the objective was to force Hanoi to give in and openly accept defeat before any discussions could take place, the policy was proving futile as well as dangerous. There was no mention of this demand in Mr. Johnson's address Wednesday; and it seems clear that this aspect of American policy has been dropped. Neither side will accept total defeat and neither side can hope for total victory. The President now wisely repeats—but with new meaning—"we will use our power with restraint."

Eloquent passages of the speech were devoted to the theme that independence and human dignity will never be won "by arms alone." This is what the Times, among others, has long argued. What was needed was an offer of unconditional discussion from a basis of strength, together with a positive, concrete, and large-scale program of economic aid for the entire region. This is now being done.

Merely negative responses from the Communists—should Hanoi and Moscow follow Peiping's lead—will only make crystal clear where the responsibility lies for pushing southeast Asia and all the world to the brink of the abyss.

## VIETNAM

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, today the Baltimore SUN devotes its second lead editorial to President Johnson's speech at John Hopkins University.

In today's editorial, the Sun rebukes those who have unjustly criticized the President's imaginative proposal.

The President's position, as the Sun's editorial clearly points out, is steadfast and reasonable. The President seized the initiative by making an offer to negotiate unconditionally at the same time that we continue to respond to military aggression from North Vietnam.

This position, coupled with the offer to assist in the economic development of the Mekong River Valley, is an excellent one, and deserves the support of all Americans.

I ask unanimous consent that this fine editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## THE REACTION

Senator DIRKSEN, in runaway rhetoric, asks if this is "another case where American trumpets sound retreat." Representative FORN wants to know if President Johnson thinks we can buy "peace, friendship, security, and solid international relationships" with dollars. Abroad, adverse reaction to the President's speech ranges from suggestions in Saigon that its purpose was to placate those, in the United States and outside, who have been urging peace negotiations to the expected Moscow charge that Mr. Johnson was trying to divert attention from American aggression in Vietnam. While the last of these requires no answer, the others invite correction, misreading as